Is the US an empire? I think so. Even if you don't agree with me Luttwak's brilliant book on how Rome held it all together and then lost it is worth a read. My italics in the review
 Intriguing, October 6, 2002
Edward Luttwak is the premiere scholar of contemporary grand strategy. In this book he brings his unique talents to the problem of Imperial Roman grand strategy. Luttwak has put together a fine and scholarly analysis of how the Romans kept their empire secure, and, how, ultimately, they failed to do so.
The book is divided into three chronological sections. In the first Luttwak discusses the system under the early empire (or principate) from Augustus to Nero. He describes this system as being the "Republican Imperial system," by which he means that the system of empire used here was the old hegemonic system employed by the expanding Republic. Luttwak clearly praises this system for getting the most security at the lowest cost. (The Atom Bomb Threat of assured destruction by the Legions)
Part two deals with the system from Vespasian to Marcus Aurelius. Luttwak describes the system in this period as being fundamentally different from that of the first. This system reflects the changed nature of the Empire from a hegemonic power to a state power. The chief object was no longer to defend Rome and Italy, but to provide complete security for every province of the Empire. (Is this where we are goiung post 9/11?)
The third part is focused on the military (and general) crisis of the third century. In this section Luttwak looks at the cost of maintaining a defensive system in relation to the benefits of doing so. Ultimately, he argues, the Roman Empire had to collapse because the benefits the provinces associated with being a memeber of a larger state were not worth the cost. ( Surely a future if the US has to garrison much of the world?)
It has been argued that Luttwak ascribes too much clarity of thought and purpose to the systems he describes. Other scholars have said that there is no evidence to support the thesis that the Roman Imperial machine ever sat down and planned a defensive system. Of course this is true, and does not counter what Luttwak is saying. Indeed, Luttwak himself says that the system was not necessarily planned as a whole, but evolved from responses to specific crises. (Is this not what is hapening now even though Richard Perle could be seen as an architect) He says, actually, that the lack of a "grand strategy" actually led to the collapse of the imperial system in the west. The primary evidence for this, as Luttwak argues, is that in the third period, whenever possible, the Romans reverted to the defensive strategy of the second period despite the fact that it was clearly outdated. Others have argued against Luttwak's analysis by claiming that the tactics used in one part of the Empire were dissimilar to those used in another. He does not make a claim counter to this, though. In fact, one of the strengths of this book is that it provides much detail on the different ways that the overall concept of a particular strategy was employed in the different regions of the Empire.
Finally, the language Luttwak uses here is concise and clear, and definitely understandable by people unfamiliar with the jargon of the military and historical communities. In addition to this astute and understandable analysis are lots and lots of excellent maps and diagrams. They alone are worth the price of the book.
Anyone interested in the Roman Empire or military history must read this ground-breaking work. As the debate on the policies of the Roman Empire continues, Luttwak's work will continue to be a prominent point of refference.
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