Respondent argued that he was the victim of an act of criminal sexual conduct committed by Evelyn because he was fourteen years old when she induced him to have sexual intercourse. He reasoned that because he was under the age of consent, his participation was legally involuntary. This argument confuses two distinct legal concepts. Because of his age at the time of the sexual conduct, the law refuses to permit the adult in the relationship to claim consent as a defense. People v Gengels, 218 Mich 632, 641; 188 NW 398 (1922) (“Proof of consent is no defense, for a female child under the statutory age is legally incapable of consenting.”); People v Bennett, 45 Mich App 127; 205 NW2d 831 (1973) (fourteen-year-old boy incapable of giving legal consent to act of taking indecent liberties). Therefore, even if respondent was a willing participant in the sexual intercourse, Evelyn could still have been charged with, at least, third-degree criminal sexual conduct. MCL 750.520d(1)(a) (victim between 13 and 16 years old).
However, the issue presented by this case is not Evelyn’s criminal culpability for criminal sexual conduct, or whether respondent was – or could have been – a “consensual” participant in that activity. Rather, we are concerned with whether respondent may be liable for child support for the child that resulted from the sexual activity. Child support is not imposed to penalize or victimize either parent. “The purpose of child support is to provide for the needs of the child.” Macomb Co Dep’t of Social Services v Westerman, 250 Mich App 372, 377; 645 NW2d 710 (2002), citing Evink v Evink, 214 Mich App 172, 175-176; 542 NW2d 328 (1995). “Child support is not imposed for the benefit of the custodial parent, but rather to satisfy the present needs of the child.” Pellar v Pellar, 178 Mich App 29, 35; 443 NW2d 427 (1989).