International Press Reports and Domestic Resources on Shock and Awe:
From Clusterfsk: “Is "Shock and Awe" a war crime under International (UN) Law?”
Some have suggested today, and yesterday, that America's "Shock and Awe" strategy constitutes a war crime under the rules set forth by the Rome Statute. While I am blissfully ignorant about US law, International Law and the Rome Statute are constant companions of mine during those days, so let me try to add some data, here. http://fsck.clusterfsck.net/archives/000012.html
From The Ornery American: War Watch “Awe, Shock, the U.N., and NATO.”
It's hard to imagine anything dumber than announcing in advance that you're going to bomb your enemy so intensely and accurately and devastatingly that the sheer Awe and Shock will cause enemy commanders to surrender. http://www.ornery.org/essays/warwatch/2003-03-10-1.html
From Pravda, “Shock and Awe” Splits America
Every day the Iraqi crisis involves more and more countries. The dictators previously overthrown by the USA, Mr. Milosevic and Mullah Omar, must be envious to see how violently the world community is protesting against a war operation in Iraq. http://english.pravda.ru/usa/2003/03/11/44238.html
The Human Face of Baghdad: http://hawaii.indymedia.org/news/2003/03/1252.php
From Green Peace: “Allied Governments Commit War Crimes with Shock and Awe”
The use of "shock and awe" tactics is illegal under international law and will inevitably result in massive civilian casualties, damage to civilian infrastructure and an environmental disaster which will leave a deadly legacy for many generations to come.
This is a war crime under the terms of both the Geneva Convention and International Criminal Court statutes. It is up to everyone - governments, the United Nations and people around the world - to call the war criminals to account.
Words are not enough. The international community and the UN must take action now to stop the slaughter, bring the US and its allies back under the rule of international law and find a peaceful resolution to this conflict.
Facts about "shock and awe" tactics:
- They are designed to launch intensive airstrikes in Iraq to make sure "there will not be a safe place in Baghdad" and that water, power and other systems necessary to sustain civilian populations are disrupted.
- They undermine the "basic rule" of humanitarian law which says that parties to war must not target civilians or infrastructure on which civilians depend to live.
- It is illegal to launch indiscriminate attacks or acts intended to spread terror among the civilian population.
- The indiscriminate nature of a "shock and awe" attack is likely to cause serious impacts on civilians, which is illegal under the following Conventions:
Fourth Geneva Convention
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
a Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
- President Bush "unsigned" the ICC Statute in the early days of his Administration
- The US is not a Party to Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, but many of the provisions of Protocol I are widely considered to represent customary international law.
- The US is a Party to the Geneva Conventions.
- Britain and Australia are parties to all these conventions and, as participants in the war, whether or not directly participating in the specific attacks, could find their officials liable for war crimes as parties aiding, abetting or assisting the United States.
http://nowar.greenpeace.org/shock_awe.php3
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
PRESS RELEASE
AI Index: MDE 14/036/2003 (Public)
News Service No: 065
21 March 2003
Iraq: 'Shock and Awe' Attack - Amnesty International Seeks Urgent Clarification of Measures to Protect Civilians
In response to the start of a large-scale attack on Baghdad, a city of 5 million people, Amnesty International is seeking urgent clarification from the US and UK governments of the measures taken to protect against civilian casualties. The organization cautioned the US and UK that under international humanitarian law, an attack must be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that it is causing disproportionate loss of civilian life.
Amnesty International notes statements by US and UK authorities asserting the intention to minimize civilian casualties, including President George Bush's March 19 statement that "I want Americans and all the world to know that coalition forces will make every effort to spare innocent civilians from harm."
US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld warned Iraqi civilians on March 20: "Once hostilities begin, stay in your homes and listen to coalition radio stations for instructions on what to do to remain safe and out of the line of fire. Iraqi civilians: Do not go to work. Stay away from military targets and any facilities where Saddam Hussein has moved military assets."
This and other verbal and written warnings from the US to Iraqi civilians do not absolve the US of the obligation to refrain from an attack that would be indiscriminate or disproportionate. http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/recent/MDE140362003?OpenDocument
Every Child Has a Name:
No War Against Iraqi Families
MADRE Mobilizes Emergency Aid for Women and Families in Iraq
March 11, New York, NY -
MADRE has launched Every Child Has a Name: No War Against Iraqi Families, a campaign to mobilize emergency medical provisions for Iraqi families, petition the UN Human Rights Commission to hold the US accountable to international law, and raise public awareness about the devastating effects of a war on Iraqi civilians.
"We are redoubling our efforts to speak out against the suffering of Iraqi women and families caused by US aggression," pledges MADRE Executive Director Vivian Stromberg. "We want to stress that the US's policies of aggression are wreaking havoc on families across the globe, from communities in Latin America to the Middle East. That's why MADRE is responding with medical and humanitarian relief for Iraqi families and working to educate the US public about this illegal and immoral war."
In March, Vivian Stromberg and Jordanian pediatrician Fathieh Saudi are conducting a nationwide speaking tour, as they testify about the impact of war on women and build on MADRE's campaign, which delivered 10 tons of milk and medicine to Iraq after the first Gulf War in 1991.
"The Pentagon's 'preemptive' Operation 'Shock and Awe' is a grave violation of international human rights law," says Yifat Susskind, MADRE's Associate Director. "If the US isn't held accountable to the same standards as other nations, then the entire framework of international law is weakened." Devastating repercussions of a US attack include: http://www.madre.org/art_iraq_EveryChild.html
22 March 2003
MEDIA RELEASE: 'Shock and Awe' Attack - Amnesty International Seeks Urgent Clarification of Measures to Protect Civilians
In response to the start of a large-scale attack on Baghdad, a city of 5 million people, Amnesty International is seeking urgent clarification from the US and UK governments of the measures taken to protect against civilian casualties. The organisation cautioned the US and UK that under international humanitarian law, an attack must be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that it is causing disproportionate loss of civilian life.
http://www.amnesty.org.nz/web/pages/home.nsf/dd5cab6801f1723585256474005327c8/68dd6d56549ffc82cc256cf0007c5bdc!OpenDocument
“Origins of Shock and Awe”
By Jefferson Morley
washingtonpost.com
Friday, March 21, 2003; 2:28 PM
The "Shock and Awe" aerial bombardment of Baghdad launched by U.S. and British forces today is based on concepts first developed in an obscure 1996 Pentagon publication.
In "Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance," former military officers Harlan K. Ullman and James Wade sought to formulate a new military strategy that could "so destroy or so confound the will to resist that an adversary will have no alternative except to accept our strategic aims and military objectives."
The concept appealed to Donald H. Rumsfeld before he became secretary of defense in 2001. In April 1999, as the Clinton administration waged an air war against Serbian forces, Rumsfeld told CNN the assault might not be forceful enough.
"There is always a risk in gradualism: It pacifies the hesitant and the tentative. What it doesn't do is shock, and awe, and alter the calculations of the people you're dealing with," Rumsefeld said.
Ullman, now a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, describes himself on the CSIS Web site as "the principal author of the doctrine of 'shock and awe,' since adopted by the Pentagon."
In Ullman's and Wade's text, available on the Pentagon's Command and Control Research Program's Web site, they wrote that the United States had to develop a new military doctrine suited to the post-Cold War world. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5948-2003Mar21.html
From Warblogging.com:
An Illegal Invasion, Liberties in America
CNN is reporting that "A-Day", the beginning of the massive, coordinated bombing campaign against Iraq, has begun. The Pentagon has nicknamed their strategy "Shock and Awe" — it's designed to put the Iraqi military in a state of shock and make them surrender in awe of massive American military power.
This war is immoral, unjust and illegal. We are the invading power, we are the aggressive power. This invasion may be likened to the American invasion of Panama or the German invasion of Czechoslovakia or the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Massive American force — unrivaled in the world — is being unleashed on a foreign country without cause. Iraq has not attacked the United States and gave no indication that an attack against the US was imminent. While Iraq was in violation of United Nations resolutions it was up to the United Nations to decide what to do about that fact, not the United States.
My country is now engaged in an aggressive, illegal war. This war is, according to international law, a crime against peace. A crime against peace is, according to the Nuremberg Principles, "Planning, preperation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances."
Now, the United Nations Charter — which the United States has signed — allows warfare in only two circumstances: self defense and under the request of the United Nations Security Council. This war is not self defense.
Oppenheim's International Law: Ninth Edition (1991, pp. 412) states:
The development of the law, particularly in the light of more recent state practice, in the 150 years since the Caroline incident suggests that action, even if it involves the use of armed force and the violation of another state’s territory, can be justified as self defence under international law where:
1. an armed attack is launched, or is immediately threatened, against a state’s territory or forces (and probably its nationals);
2. there is an urgent necessity for defensive action against that attack;
3. there is no practicable alternative to action in self-defense, and in particular another state or other authority which has the legal powers to stop or prevent the infringement does not, or cannot, use them to that effect;
4. the action taken by way of self-defense is limited to what is necessary to stop or prevent the infringement, i.e. to the needs of defense
I think it clear that this action is not justified under Oppenheim's explanation of self defense. And, of course, this war has not been authorized by the United Nations Security Council.
Therefore the United States is currently committing a crime against peace. You'll notice that the document I quote regarding crimes against peace is called the Nuremberg Principles. This document was used to define the scope and purpose of the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, a tribunal which tried and convicted German leadership for the waging of aggressive war.
How far have we come that, almost sixty years after the end of World War II, more than fifty years since the Nuremberg Tribunal, we ourselves commit aggressive war? What kind of country are we that we feel we can just enforce international law ourselves, and become criminals ourselves in the process?
Even as we commit this crime against peace we're talking about arresting Iraqi military personnel who set fire to oil wells or use WMD. Someone once observed in a comment on Warblogging that the rule of law disintegrates when applied inconsitently. The United States is selectively applying the Geneva Conventions and other forms of international law when it suits us, but when it doesn't — such as when we ourselves are violating those laws — we, of course, ignore them and call them immaterial.
Even as we are committing the crime of aggressive war our government is talking about how to oppress us here at home. The Department of Defense still wants to build Total Information Awareness, a project of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency designed to survail every aspect of every American's life to look for "patterns of terrorist activity". The USA Patriot Act is still in force, meaning that hundreds or thousands of people in America are currently being secretly watched by the FBI. The Department of Justice hasn't forgotten about The Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003. Under DSEA '03 the government could take away anyone's citizenship if they even provided a $1 donation to a "terrorist organisation".
http://www.warblogging.com/archives/000561.php
US Conducts First Ever Precision Only Strike
US military officials say the massive air strikes on Baghdad and other Iraqi targets that began on 21 March delivered exclusively precision-guided munitions - a historic first.
http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jdw/jdw030323_1_n.shtml
International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative
http://www.ihlresearch.org/portal/ihli/matrix.php?i=3159
Fighting Fair: The laws of war and how they grew.
By David Greenberg
Posted Thursday, January 17, 2002, at 11:45 AM PT http://slate.msn.com/id/2060816/
Total Preparedness
The case for the Defense Department’s Total Information Awareness project. By Jonathan Levin
Several months ago DARPA, the Department of Defense's Research and Development arm, announced the Total Information Awareness (TIA) project, a radical new tool for FBI and CIA intelligence gathering. Since then, TIA has been assailed as a danger to constitutionally protected individual rights and privacy. As a result, Congress has balked at funding TIA, and instead attempted to increase the effectiveness of existing programs by creating a centralized terrorism intelligence office. In the long run, improved intelligence distribution and TIA can each contribute to a sound antiterrorism apparatus. http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-levin021303.asp
War For World Dominance
by Karen Talbot
February 05, 2003
"Shock and Awe"
All of that will pale by comparison with what's ahead. When Bush gives the word, "the full force and might of the U.S. military" will be unleashed in an unprovoked assault against a nation of 22 million people who already have suffered immeasurably from brutal war and economic sanctions-a country which ironically is the "cradle of civilization."
Even as Bush spoke before the joint session of Congress, the Pentagon leaked reports that the U.S. will hit Iraq with up to 800 cruise missiles in two days-more than twice the number of missiles launched during the entire 40 days of the 1991 Gulf War. The intent is to shatter Iraq "physically, emotionally and psychologically." The objective is to "shock and awe."
The "Shock and Awe" scheme was concocted by military strategist Harlan Ullman who said "you have this simultaneous effect-rather like the nuclear weapons at Hiroshima-not taking days or weeks but minutes."* A Pentagon official told CBS News following a briefing on the plan: "The sheer size of this has never been seen before, never been contemplated before."
A senior Bush official confirmed that "Shock and Awe" is the concept on which the war plan is based," according to CBS News.
"Shock and Awe" is aimed at demonstrating what Armageddon would look like. It is aimed at trying to terrify the people and nations of the world-any who might dare challenge U.S. dominance or stand in the way of conquest and plunder. Bush and his entourage have repeatedly stressed that Iraq will be just the beginning of an unprecedented ongoing war. Add this his threat to use nuclear weapons in a pre-emptive first strike. Any country he labels part of the "axis of evil" is fair game. Zbigniew Bzrezinski in his book, "The Grand Chessboard" dubs this as a "new kind of hegemony," a "benevolent" imperialism.
Bush exhibits absolutely no glimmer of human concern for the tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians who will die horrible deaths. Almost half of the Iraqi people are under age 14, so a high percentage of civilian deaths will be children. This is on top of the more than 500,000 children who have died from the sanctions according to UNICEF. And what of the additional hundreds of thousands who will suffer injuries, illness, hunger, and total disruption of their lives.
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=15&;ItemID=2969
REVIEW of Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance
by
Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade
With
L.A. "Bud" Edney, Fred M. Franks, Charles A. Horner, Jonathan T. Howe, and Keith Brendley
Excerpt:
"To the extent that vigorous debate ensues we will be successful": is how Dr. David S. Alberts forcefully concludes his foreword to Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade's Shock and Awe: Achieving World Dominance (NDU Press, 1996, reproduced on the internet at http://www.dodccrp.org/shockIndex.html), a publication of the Command and Control Research Program (CCRP) within the Office of the Assistant US Secretary of Defense (homepage http://www.dodccrp.org/ ). The "vigorous debate" refers, of course, to the military milieu. But in terms of public input, look at all the success the world over, the millions rallying against the war. The Bushmen ignore us, despite Bush's words "Dissent is the lifeblood of democracy," early on the morning of the January 18, the day of the massive worldwide ANSWER coalition antiwar rallies. And stayed all weekend at Camp David continuing to plan his Armageddon as if we didn't exist.
Excerpt:
This 1996 book—actually, 70-page pamphlet—is in the news apropos of the announcement by the Bush administration[1] of the details of the strategy, drawn from it, for the preemptive warfare it plans against Iraq: "The US intends to shatter Iraq "physically, emotionally and psychologically" by raining down on its people as many as 800 cruise missiles in two days. The Pentagon battle plan aims not only to crush Iraqi troops, but also wipe out power and water supplies in the capital, Baghdad. It is based on a strategy known as 'Shock and Awe,' conceived at the National Defense University (NDU) in Washington, in which between 300 and 400 cruise missiles would fall on Iraq each day for two consecutive days. It would be more than twice the number of missiles launched during the entire 40 days of the 1991 Gulf War.".[2]
If you are looking for a scientific treatise, go elsewhere. Neither Shock and Awe nor Rapid Dominance is defined until well into the book. They are discussed immediately, so that the reader can gather clues as to the meaning of these two thematic concepts. Finally, on p. 12 rapid and dominance are defined separately and then discussed as if defined as a unit. Then on p. 13, lest we become too credulous, we receive the reiteration "'Dominance' means the ability to control a situation totally." Not in my dictionary (Webster's new World College, 4th ed.), which has, simply "control, authority." I'd say what the writer meant really was "total control of a situation." Ability in this regard hinges on other factors. But we must wait until Appendix A for a scientific definition of Rapid Dominance, as much as it is understood (see further below)
Excerpt:
Chapter 2, a chamber of horrors, offers a tour of the various, but not exhaustive categories of Shock and Awe warfare: overwhelming force; Hiroshima and Nagasaki; massive bombardment; Blitzkrieg; Sun Tzu," based on selective, instant decapitation (or other equally horrifying forms of amputation to make examples out of isolated victims) of military or societal targets to achieve Shock and Awe."[4] (p. 28); SAS; my favorite, Potemkin Village (gunboat diplomacy is a variant of this); the Roman Legions; Decay and Default (this includes Chinese water torture); and Royal Canadian Mounted Police. We are treated to examples of each and review the advantages and shortcomings. Nothing is perfect, after all.
Beneath the surface, when not explicit, wistfully looms the specter of the ultimate, perfect victory, Hiroshima/Nagasaki: "delivery of instant, nearly incomprehensible levels of massive destruction directed at influencing society writ large, meaning its leadership and public," incapacitating the adversary from even considering retaliation. Posterity can only approximate that, fight it though the Bushmen may. Shock and Awe warfare strives toward perfect and complete, rapid victory, Rapid [rabid?]Dominance: "[W]e are seeking the capability to dominate, control, and isolate the entire environment in, around, over, and under the objective area as quickly as possible, and with fewer forces than currently envisaged, although direct insertion of forces is an important component depending upon the tactical situation." (p. 20).
http://www.legitgov.org/essay_steele_review_shock_and_awe_versionIII_020303.html
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WAR CRIMES
A Report on United States War Crimes Against Iraq to the Commission of Inquiry for the International War Crimes Tribunal
by Ramsey Clark and Others
1992
Table of Contents from the print edition Not including the WWW Index or Introduction http://www.deoxy.org/wc/wc-toc.htm
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