Imports to the West Coast ground to a halt in late September 2002 as the dispute between dock owners and the ILWU grew heated as owners shut down the docks. A federal judge ordered a 60-day colling off period in which workers were required to return to work. Shortly thereafter, the main issue of contention appeared to be resolved: and "West Coast Ports Set Tentative Deal", WSJ November 4, 2002.
If the dock owners were able to make a truly take-it-or-leave-it offer, would the ILWU have accepted a deal in which new technologies are introduced and new technology jobs are non-unionized? If the ILWU were able to make a truly take-it-or-leave-it offer, would the dock owners have been willing to accept a deal in which no new technology is ever introduced? My own opinion is that the dock owners truly required that the new technologies be introduced, so in fact the final deal is very close to their outside option, i.e. the union was the big "winner". (In terms of our class game, they offered the owners only $1 and the owners accepted.)
How could the parties come to agreement -- with the union victorious -- so quickly after a judge forced the workers back to work? Which of the following helped the union and which (if any) helped the owners: (i) Christmas, (ii) 60-day limit to cooling-off period, (iii) AFL-CIO involvement?
[Categories: Game Theory]
2:14:17 PM 
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