What's done is done. Now what?
Whether you favored it or not--and I didn't--the war in Iraq is now a fait accompli. While the debate goes on about the motives and arguments for starting the war, at least two columnists have moved on to we're-already-there-so-now-what-happens?
Thomas Friedman, just back from vacation, urges us to focus on the Real War., as opposed to the fingerpointing contest about WMD, intel, etc.
Last Sunday was the most important day in Iraq since the start of the war, and maybe the most important day in its modern history. It was the first day that one could speak about the "liberation" of Iraq. It was the day that a multireligious, multiethnic Governing Council of Iraqi men and women began to assume some power and responsibility for their own country — the most representative leadership Iraq has ever had.
For me, though, it is a disturbing thought that the Bush team could get itself so tied up defending its phony reasons for going to war — the notion that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction that were undeterrable and could threaten us, or that he had links with Al Qaeda — that it could get distracted from fulfilling the real and valid reason for the war: to install a decent, tolerant, pluralistic, multireligious government in Iraq that would be the best answer and antidote to both Saddam and Osama.
Among Friedman's tips for winning the real war: Reinvade the regions that are still fighting--and then shower them with aid. He's sincere about this modest proposal (we called it escalation during the Vietnam war). Where is Jonathan Swift--now that we really need him? Was Friedman ever in the military? Did he ever run a company? Does he know anything about honest persuasion (as opposed to lies the Bush administration has been telling us)? Does he believe in cost-versus-benefit analyses? Or is he part of the dont-ask-me-how-much-it-will cost Donald Rumsfeld school of economics?
In a Guardian column that is more descriptive than prescriptive, Jonathan Steele mulls the classic dilemma of collaboration.
Many Iraqis are suspicious of US intentions, particularly when it comes to their oil. Others are merely angry that promises to bring security and normality are still so far from being achieved.
In either case potential Iraqi leaders have to be careful how far they identify themselves with the occupying authorities. It is the classic colonial dilemma for local leaders in a country run by foreigners.
Will they become the scapegoats for American and British failings? Will the coalition now shift the blame for delays in getting electricity going by telling Iraqis to complain to their own ministers, whom the council will appoint? Is the council a device for starting the process of writing a constitution and holding elections, or just a fig-leaf for coalition inadequacy and a rubber stamp?
Steele, unlike Friedman, acknowledges the complexity of the problem and its historical roots. Certainly we're not making the classic dilemma any easier for these potential Iraqi leaders by bringing in US mega-firms, spurning UN help, and appointing a neocon to run the joint.
12:50:38 AM 
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