Monday, September 20, 2004

Posted here Monday, September 20, 2004 at 4:49:46 PM     Steve Clemmons being serious about government secrecy. see http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/ for today Via FUGOP (see this excellent site), I received a valuable and thought-provoking report (released on September 14th) "Secrecy in the Bush Administration," prepared for Congressman Henry Waxman by the Special Investigations Division/Minority Staff of the House Committee on Government Reform. I have just spent the last hour and a half reading it, and the problem is worse than I thought. This is a small selection from this excellent report that converges with my own frustrations trying to get important policy data from the government, current and historical: Beginning in the 1960s, Congress enacted a series of landmark laws that promote "government in the sunshine." These include the Freedom of Information Act, the Presidential Records Act, and the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Each of these laws enables the public to view the internal workings of the executive branch. And each has been narrowed in scope and application under the Bush Administration. Freedom of Information Act The Freedom of Information Act is the primary law providing access to information held by the executive branch. Adopted in 1966, FOIA established the principle that the public should have broad access to government records. Under the Bush Administration, however, the statute's reach has been narrowed and agencies have resisted FOIA requests through procedural tactics and delay. The Administration has:  Issued guidance reversing the presumption in favor of disclosure and instructing agencies to withhold a broad and undefined category of "sensitive" information;  Supported statutory and regulatory changes that preclude disclosure of a wide range of information, including information relating to the economic, health, and security infrastructure of the nation; and  Placed administrative obstacles in the way of organizations seeking to use FOIA to obtain federal records, such as denials of fee waivers and delays in agency responses. Independent academic experts consulted for this report decried these trends. They stated that the Administration has "radically reduced the public right to know," that its policies "are not only sucking the spirit out of the FOIA, but shriveling its very heart," and that no Administration in modern times has "done more to conceal the workings of government from the people." Secrecy undermines the ecosystem of transparency that is vital for democracy's survival. When official secrecy dominates a political system, structural corruption thrives. I have been giving a lot of thought to structural corruption in America -- and what the corruption of America's blue chip media organizations, political parties, religious institutions, and corporations means. I want to write an article soon that compares right-wing Republican kingpin and harrasser of moderate Republicans Tom DeLay to Japan's late kingmaker Shin Kanemaru. RAND has sometimes placed self-interest above the public good, in my view, but Arnold Horelick was hitting exactly the right target, more than two decades ago. In any case, read this report. -- Steve Clemons ********

Posted here Monday, September 20, 2004 at 4:40:41 PM     How do you take six billion people who are not so smart, and their leaders who are not so smart, and put them together in a system which by its nature attracts some to want to own it and control it? The founding fathers opted for checks and balances, a government that actually doesn't work well, on the idea that if it did, it would be a tyranny. What would a future equivalent of the founders' vision, deep in tolerance and curiosity, look like? ********

Posted here Monday, September 20, 2004 at 4:11:27 PM     A ver full discussion of the options in raq over at http://scoop.agonist.org/story/2004/9/19/211433/693 It starts   First, the United States can effect what I would call a strategic and orderly retreat. This is the option that General Odom has called for in a recent National Interest essay. The benefits of this plan are limited to a pause in the tempo of our war fighting capability, offering us some much needed time to recoup our losses, refit and retrain. We would then have more freedom of action in Afghanistan, as more resources would be freed up for a more focused and judicious application in that sad land. The downside to this option would be the global and regional perception that we had been beaten, driven out by a rag-tag army of "dead-enders" and terrorist thugs. The perception would be akin to the loss of prestige suffered by the Israeli's upon their unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon, magnified ten times. This option would also reduce the amount of capital we are currently sinking into Iraq. This is no small sum as our current burn rate is roughly $4 billion a month. The success of this option would largely be in our hands, not that of the enemy. Success therefore, would be highly probable. The second option is that which I believe the United States is currently considering. This option entails a large offensive into regions that are currently labeled by the media as "no-go" zones. These areas include, but are not limited to, Fallujah, Ramadi, Baquba and Samarra. The benefits of the successful conclusion of this option are significant. One would assume that the insurgency would be crippled, perhaps permanently. Furthermore, the United States and her allies would attain virtual freedom of action in the region to effect political accommodation by other, adversarial, regimes. However, this scenario is not without grave risks itself. First, one must take into consideration the plain fact that the enemy has a choice in this option too. Frankly, our performance has not been successful to date. If it were, there would be no insurgency. His vote, therefore, counts. However, I would not count out the bravery and determination of the American fighting force. Our will is formidable when the politicians do not meddle. This option would also grant us a small window of opportunity to effect some necessary political accommodations in Iraq, accommodations necessary to our future success. There are other significant risks that I would call political. One, the fallout from the massive civilian deaths that would arise from such an offensive and the regional and global outcry would be significant and should not be underestimated. Second the amount of capital required to rebuild Iraq after the intense urban fighting this scenario calls for would be immense. A rough guess: double our current burn rate for a short time, perhaps six months, and then a return to the current rate. Finally, the amount of US casualties will also be extremely high. This option would probably not pass the "Dover Test" but in the current media environment would probably be feasible. Success in this option would be possible but not certain. Finally, we come to the last option, which I would term the "More of the Same" option. We can continue down the fruitless path were are currently trudging. We would see the same amount of casualties, the same burn rate and a fighting force stretched to the very limits of effectiveness. This solution offers no political resolution in the region, maintains the strain on our fighting force and expenditures with few visible benefits other than delaying the inevitable choices mentioned above. One can hope that things will get better but hope is not a policy. The possibility of success arising from this option is virtually zero. These are the options as I see them. This risk versus reward discussion is in no way complete. I simply lay it before you to consider. However, I believe these are the only realistic options we have. We can consider them with the full force of our reasoning faculties or we can bury our heads in the sand. But in the end, I believe we will be faced with two choices: one rich in blood and the possibility of victory; the other, simply an admission of our inability to effect our will. Either way, our choices are not good. ********

Posted here Monday, September 20, 2004 at 9:00:31 AM     Difficult times. The mess in Iraq has no obvious solution. leaving, not leaving, elections, or not. If we put it as Bin Laden or the US gets to win, we see the difficulty. And then connections to Israel, and Iran, the near certainty of a deeper war based on those alone. And  Palestinian civil war, and an Israeli civil war. Then we have the economy, with diminishing resources for the US to do anything, including repairing its own society. Lets look at the longer term, the phases of a large society going from hope to despair. Ten ears, twenty years. We know that, at the worst, there will be a recovery, probably not to something completely familiar, but also not completely unknown. Building toward the new emerging decency, belief in people and institutions, in art and education, children and private time - these should be a major part of our concern, being ready to breathe along with the emergence of a better sense... ********