First, the United States can effect what I would call a strategic and orderly retreat. This is the option that General Odom has called for in a recent National Interest essay. The benefits of this plan are limited to a pause in the tempo of our war fighting capability, offering us some much needed time to recoup our losses, refit and retrain. We would then have more freedom of action in Afghanistan, as more resources would be freed up for a more focused and judicious application in that sad land. The downside to this option would be the global and regional perception that we had been beaten, driven out by a rag-tag army of "dead-enders" and terrorist thugs. The perception would be akin to the loss of prestige suffered by the Israeli's upon their unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon, magnified ten times. This option would also reduce the amount of capital we are currently sinking into Iraq. This is no small sum as our current burn rate is roughly $4 billion a month. The success of this option would largely be in our hands, not that of the enemy. Success therefore, would be highly probable.
The second option is that which I believe the United States is currently considering. This option entails a large offensive into regions that are currently labeled by the media as "no-go" zones. These areas include, but are not limited to, Fallujah, Ramadi, Baquba and Samarra. The benefits of the successful conclusion of this option are significant. One would assume that the insurgency would be crippled, perhaps permanently. Furthermore, the United States and her allies would attain virtual freedom of action in the region to effect political accommodation by other, adversarial, regimes. However, this scenario is not without grave risks itself. First, one must take into consideration the plain fact that the enemy has a choice in this option too. Frankly, our performance has not been successful to date. If it were, there would be no insurgency. His vote, therefore, counts. However, I would not count out the bravery and determination of the American fighting force. Our will is formidable when the politicians do not meddle. This option would also grant us a small window of opportunity to effect some necessary political accommodations in Iraq, accommodations necessary to our future success.
There are other significant risks that I would call political. One, the fallout from the massive civilian deaths that would arise from such an offensive and the regional and global outcry would be significant and should not be underestimated. Second the amount of capital required to rebuild Iraq after the intense urban fighting this scenario calls for would be immense. A rough guess: double our current burn rate for a short time, perhaps six months, and then a return to the current rate. Finally, the amount of US casualties will also be extremely high. This option would probably not pass the "Dover Test" but in the current media environment would probably be feasible. Success in this option would be possible but not certain.
Finally, we come to the last option, which I would term the "More of the Same" option. We can continue down the fruitless path were are currently trudging. We would see the same amount of casualties, the same burn rate and a fighting force stretched to the very limits of effectiveness. This solution offers no political resolution in the region, maintains the strain on our fighting force and expenditures with few visible benefits other than delaying the inevitable choices mentioned above. One can hope that things will get better but hope is not a policy. The possibility of success arising from this option is virtually zero.
These are the options as I see them. This risk versus reward discussion is in no way complete. I simply lay it before you to consider. However, I believe these are the only realistic options we have. We can consider them with the full force of our reasoning faculties or we can bury our heads in the sand. But in the end, I believe we will be faced with two choices: one rich in blood and the possibility of victory; the other, simply an admission of our inability to effect our will. Either way, our choices are not good.
