In a famous passage in Phaedrus, Plato defines the two fundamental principles or processes of rational thought (see below for the complete passage): synthesis and analysis.
In describing analysis, Plato uses a now famous metaphor: "[The principle] of dividing things again by classes, where the natural joints are, and not trying to break any part, after the manner of a bad carver." What could be more intuitive than carving reality at its "natural joints" as one carves meat at its joints? As Daniel Dennett would say, this metaphor is a powerful "intuition pump".
The only problem is, there is no "natural" way of jointing meat! This fact was just brought home to me by an amazing report entitled, "Successful business componentisation implies finding the natural joints". The obviously broadly-read author (whom I believe is Richard Pawson formerly of CSC Research and now of www.nakedobjects.org) unites the finer details of philosophy, IT, and beef butchering. Richard discusses "the different standards for jointing a carcass of beef in England, France and the United States," and illustrates it with the following diagram:
This is a graphic demonstration that there is no "natural" way to cut beef at its joints. Although "all have a common goal to maximise the total revenue, or yield, from the carcass" the "standard" jointing in a given culture is the result of socio-economic-culinary preferences in a given culture that change over time!
As my philosopher-friend Keith pointed out, this analysis is worthy of the best deconstructionists.
What I also find incredible (as usual) is how I came across this amazing report. I was reading "Design Rules: The Power of Modularity", which used Plato's "carving at the joints" quote. I remembered how much I liked the quote, so I Googled it to get the exact quote to add to my growing list of quotes (which I'll link to someday). That's how I found the report. Of course, then I go to read the context of the quote in Phaedrus, only to be blown away by the fact that is it part of Plato's definition of dialectic, which is central to my evolving philosophical system as well as my evolving understanding of IT system design based on aspect-oriented modeling:
[I]f I think any other man is able to see things that can naturally be collected into one and divided into many, him I follow after and walk in his footsteps as if he were a god. And whether the name I give to those who can do this is right or wrong, God knows, but I have called them hitherto dialecticians.
Its all coming together is a frighteningly powerful way.
Socrates: It seems to me that the discourse was, as a whole,
[265d] really sportive jest; but in these chance utterances were involved two principles, the essence of which it would be gratifying to learn, if art could teach it.
Phaedrus: What principles?
Socrates: That of perceiving and bringing together in one idea the scattered particulars, that one may make clear by definition the particular thing which he wishes to explain; just as now, in speaking of Love, we said what he is and defined it, whether well or ill. Certainly by this means the discourse acquired clearness and consistency.
Phaedrus: And what is the other principle, Socrates?
[265e]
Socrates: That of dividing things again by classes, where the natural joints are, and not trying to break any part, after the manner of a bad carver. As our two discourses just now assumed one common principle, unreason, and then,
[266a] just as the body, which is one, is naturally divisible into two, right and left, with parts called by the same names, so our two discourses conceived of madness as naturally one principle within us, and one discourse, cutting off the left-hand part, continued to divide this until it found among its parts a sort of left-handed love, which it very justly reviled, but the other discourse, leading us to the right-hand part of madness, found a love having the same name as the first,
[266b] but divine, which it held up to view and praised as the author of our greatest blessings.
Phaedrus: Very true.
Socrates: Now I myself, Phaedrus, am a lover of these processes of division and bringing together, as aids to speech and thought; and if I think any other man is able to see things that can naturally be collected into one and divided into many, him I follow after and
walk in his footsteps as if he were a god.
And whether the name I give to those who can do this is right or wrong, God knows,
[266c] but I have called them hitherto dialecticians.
9:01:43 PM 
