My friends at Lucianne.com appreciate when I point out the miscalculations this Republican administration has made.
I found this nice article by UPI that is kind of a laundry list of the miscalculations this Republican administration has made with respect to Iraq. It is also interesting to think about these, and then monitor the Republican denial-meter. Things are such a mess in Iraq, due to the incompetence of the Republican administration, that it is getting increasingly difficult for them to continue the denial and panglossian, pollyanna spin that so characterizes all of their endeavors.
Here's the article:
"WASHINGTON, May 26 (UPI) -- "Less than cosmetic" is how a former high-ranking United Nations official closely involved in the Iraq dossier called the much-hyped and highly anticipated June 30 handover date, the day when the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority transfers sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government and ceases to exist.
Judging from President George W. Bush's statements made Monday night at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pa., June 30 should suddenly herald stability and democracy from the chaotic state of affairs Iraq finds itself in today, a year after the fall of Saddam Hussein.
In his 31-minute address to the nation -- and to Iraq -- the president outlined his five-step plan aimed at bringing about a successful transition of power in Iraq, come that fateful June 30 date. However, the president gave no details as to how democracy would ensue in a country that has been plagued by insurgency and political confusion since the U.S.-led coalition invaded last year. All the same, the president did warn that more violence should be expected before as well as after the handover of power. Regrettably, that is probably the only certainty.
Reversing previous policy that intended to exclude the United Nations, as June 30 approaches, all eyes now are focused on Lakhdar Brahimi, the Algerian veteran diplomat working frantically around the clock to meet the self-appointed deadline set by the Bush team. But what will this mean in reality, and what impact will June 30 have on the ground?
The president said in his Monday speech that Iraq would reclaim "full sovereignty." That, of course is not entirely correct. A nation can hardly claim to profess full self-governance while more than 150,000 foreign combat troops remain on its territory, and over which they hold no say. Furthermore, according to a May public opinion poll published by the Iraq Center for Research and Strategic Studies, the coalition is seen as an "occupation" force by 88.5 percent of the population. And all indications given by the president show that the 138,000 American troops in Iraq are not about to leave anytime soon. Not to mention the U.S. Embassy, which will be one of the largest in the world.
That is unless of course, another change of policy occurs. A number of observers agree there has been a lack of clear policy and pre-emptive thinking when it comes to Iraq.
"This policy is giving incoherence a bad name," said Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute.
Considering that in the last year there have been no less than 16 policy changes and mistakes, one more should offer no great surprise. For the sake of clarity, here they are.
One: Weapons of mass destruction. They were the underlying reason stated for going to war. A year later, they remain to be found.
Two: Saddam's link to international terrorism. Much like the WMDs, the link between the former Iraqi dictator and al-Qaida remains to be established. Indeed, the fall of Saddam had invited all sorts of terrorists and fundamentalists to converge on Iraq in hope of fighting and killing American soldiers.
Three: The United Nations: Initially sidelined by the Bush administration, all hopes for a cohesive transition of power from the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority to an interim Iraqi government now rests on the shoulders of a single U.N. diplomat, Lakhdar Brahimi.
Four: The misconception that coalition troops would be welcomed as liberators. The Bush administration maintained that American, British and other forces would be received with flowers and open arms, just as in Kuwait in 1991. All warnings that Iraq is not Kuwait were ignored.
Five: "Mission Accomplished" and "Bring 'em on." The president's premature declaration of victory aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln on May 1, 2003, declaring the "end of major combat operations." In fact, it was after that statement was made that the U.S. suffered its most casualties. The president's challenge to terrorists and insurgents to "bring 'em on," was indeed heeded.
Six: Warnings that there would not be enough troops to occupy Iraq in an adequate manner and allow the occupation forces to maintain security and stability.
Seven: Dissolving the Iraqi army, a move resulting in several hundreds of thousands of armed, angry and unemployed Iraqis roaming the streets, and providing easy recruits for anti-coalition resistance.
Eight: Cashiering Baath Party functionaries -- the bureaucracy that made the country run -- and putting 30,000 people out of work, while paralyzing all echelons of the state.
Nine: Allowing the looting and rioting which erupted in the early days of the occupation and led the way to greater anarchy.
Ten: Banking on the newly formed Iraqi army, which ultimately failed to perform in Fallujah and other hot spots.
Eleven: Naming former Baath officers in charge of the Fallujah force, then reneging on the nomination.
Twelve: Erring on the cost estimates of the war. The administration initially said Iraqi oil revenues would cover the cost of the war. This of course failed to happen, and Bush requested $87 billion to cover costs. The president recently said he would need an additional $25 billion.
Thirteen: Betting on Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, hoping he would rally around the coalition along with his Shiite followers. Sistani, the most influential Shiite leader in Iraq, has consistently cold-shouldered the coalition, refusing to meet with U.S. administrator L. Paul Bremer.
Fourteen: Going after Moqtada Sadr, the militant Shiite cleric, and issuing an edict that the U.S. wanted him "dead or alive." The ensuing battles that have raged in Sadr City, Najaf and Kufa, resulted in additional U.S. casualties and hundreds of Iraqi deaths. These clashes have further embittered the civilian population. Additionally, and far more dangerous for the United States, is alienating the Shiites at large, including those in Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Combined, they represent a powerful force to be reckoned with.
Fifteen: The Abu Ghraib prison scandal: the torture, abuse and humiliation of Iraqi prisoners that have generated even greater resentment against the United States in Iraq and the Arab world.
Sixteen: The Ahmed Chalabi fiasco -- supporting the leader of the Iraqi National Congress who now stands accused of passing intelligence to Iran, among other wrongdoings.
All this should be swept aside come June 30 for Iraq's new beginning.
It's true that the CPA will cease to exist at sunrise on July 1, when the Stars and Stripes are raised over the new U.S. presiding over an embassy with a staff of more than 1,700 people will hold considerable influence over the new Iraqi government. So just how "cosmetic" the changes that will accompany the June 30 handover really be remains to be seen."
7:25:53 PM 
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