When St. looks out into the future, thru the Holy Spirit that inspires his mind and heart he sees nothing that would attract him to that is held to be of calue in this world.

A. The Word Group Outside the NT.

1. logiízomai. In secular Greek this word is used a. commercially for [base "]to reckon,[per thou] [base "]to charge,[per thou] and b. more generally for [base "]to deliberate,[per thou] [base "]to conclude.[per thou]

[COMMENT.ip.crl.3.18.2005.palm.sunday.reflections.elder.ephraim.counsels..ch.1[per thou]On Salvation and Paradise.[per thou] #5]

[c.1] Who looking upward would not find that he sees into eternity, before the face of God in that [base "]darkly mirror[per thou] which is revealed ot us in faith. On the other hand, when looking outward, he sees all the world and all that it has to offer, which is the words of St. Paul, is considered a [OE]noisy gong and a tiknlikg cymbal.[per thou] [1 Cor.] [c.2]

[end.comment]

In the LXX it takes on the nuance: a. of an emotional and even volitional act, e.g., devising, or counting in the subjective sense (see TDNT, IV, 284[^]85 for details). It also: [comment.to.notes.1] Referring to TDNT, IV, 284-285. This word logizmoi is used of [OE]strict logical rules,[base '] or [OE]reckoning.[base '] It can also have the meaning of [OE]evaluating.[base '] [There seems to be some parallel to the thinking of Ignatius of Loyola in his spiritual exercises when he considers the third method of making a decison; that is, thru strict reasoning of the advantages and disadvantages fo a thing to vbe decided on, see Spir. exercises, [OE]On making a Decison[base ']] Could this evaluating of a situation not also have some meaning attachhed to it in reference to [OE]COUNSEL[base '] of the Holy Spirit. Here, as mentioned in the COMMENTS above is what Elder Ephraim speaks about in his counsels on [base "]On Salvation and Paradise.[per thou] I mean he considers its advantages in striving for and the disadvantages and dangers in not striving for it. This too, is what Aquinas means when he says that [OE]free-will[base '] is the will under the aspect of considering the perfect means to an end, rather the will itself must be considered as the last end, which is Charity or the Holy Spirit, which is the human image of that perfect will of God for Himself, Love or the Holy Spirit. [comment.to.notes.2] TDNT, IV, 284-285 speaks about class. lit. referring to logi÷zomai as [base "]deliberation,[per thou] or [base "]to conclude.[per thou] This is precisely what the soul deliberates about, what God has in his Divine Providence has chosen for each soul, [OE]I consider,[base '] do not worry about what you are to say [OE]for it will the Spirit of my Father speaking in you.[base '] Again, this [OE]consideration[base '] is what the Fathers of the Church have done in their reflections on the Mysteries of Faith. Aquinas speaks about the faculties of the intellect, following Aristotle, whcih considers the [OE]indivisibles,[base '] and tha twhich considers [OE]definitions[base '] as such or compsoes and divides. Again, in the introduction to the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle gives this detailed preface to the logistic works of the Stagirite:

FOREWORD OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

As the Philosopher says in Metaphysics I (980b26), "the human race lives by art and reasonings." In this statement the Philosopher seems to touch upon that property whereby man differs from the other animals. For the other animals are prompted to their acts by a natural impulse, but man is directed in his actions by a judgment of reason. And this is the reason why there are various arts devoted to the ready and orderly performance of human acts. For an art seems to be nothing more than a definite and fixed procedure established by reason, whereby human acts reach their due end through appropriate means. Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle Foreword p 1 Now reason is not only able to direct the acts of the lower powers but is also director of its own act: for what is peculiar to the intellective part of man is its ability to reflect upon itself. For the intellect knows itself. In like manner reason is able to reason about its own act. Therefore just as the art of building or carpentering, through which man is enabled to perform manual acts in an easy and orderly manner, arose from the fact that reason reasoned about manual acts, so in like manner an art is needed to direct the act of reasoning, so that by it a man when performing the act of reasoning might proceed in an orderly and easy manner and without error. And this art is logic, i.e., the science of reason. And it concerns reason not only because it is according to reason, for that is common to all arts, but also because it is concerned with the very act of reasoning as with its proper matter. Therefore it seems to be the art of the arts, because it directs us in the act of reasoning, from which all arts proceed. Consequently one should view the parts of logic according to the diversity among the acts of reason.

Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle Foreword p 1

Now there are three acts of the reason, the first two of which belong to reason regarded as an intellect. One action of the intellect is the understanding of indivisible or uncomplex things, and according to this action it conceives what a thing is. And this operation is called by some the informing of the intellect, or representing by means of the intellect. To this operation of the reason is ordained the doctrine which Aristotle hands down in the book of Predicaments, [i.e., Categories]. The second operation of the intellect is its act of combining or dividing, in which the true or the false are for the first time present. And this act of reason is the subject of the doctrine which Aristotle hands down in the book entitled On Interpretation. But the third act of the reason is concerned with that which is peculiar to reason, namely, to advance from one thing to another in such a way that through that which is known a man comes to a knowledge of the unknown. And this act is considered in the remaining books of logic.

Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle Foreword p 2

It should be noted that the acts of reason are in a certain sense not unlike the acts of nature: hence so far as it can, art imitates nature. Now in the acts of nature we observe a threefold diversity. For in some of them nature acts from necessity, i.e., in such a way that it cannot fail; in others, nature acts so as to succeed for the most part, although now and then it fails in its act. Hence in this latter case there must be a twofold act: one which succeeds in the majority of cases, as when from seed is generated a perfect animal; the other when nature fails in regard to what is appropriate to it, as when from seed something monstrous is generated owing to a defect in some principle.

Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle Foreword p 2

These three are found also in the acts of the reason. For there is one process of reason which induces necessity, where it is not possible to fall short of the truth; and by such a process of reasoning the certainty of science is acquired. Again, there is a process of reason in which something true in most cases is concluded but without producing necessity. But the third process of reason is that in which reason fails to reach a truth because some principle which should have been observed in reasoning was defective.

Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle Foreword p 2

Now the part of logic which is devoted to the first process is called the judicative part, because it leads to judgments possessed of the certitude of science. And because a certain and sure judgment touching effects cannot be obtained except by analyzing them into their first principles, this part is called analytical, i.e., resolvent. Furthermore, the certitude obtained by such an analysis of a judgment is derived either from the mere form of the syllogism--and to this is ordained the book of the Prior Analytics which treats of the syllogism as such--or from the matter along with the form, because the propositions employed are per se and necessary [cf. infra, Lectures 10, 13]--and to this is ordained the book of the Posterior Analytics which is concerned with the demonstrative syllogism. Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle Foreword p 2 To the second process of reason another part of logic called investigative is devoted. For investigation is not always accompanied by certitude. Hence in order to have certitude a judgment must be formed, bearing on that which has been investigated. But just as in the works of nature which succeed in the majority of cases certain levels are achieved--because the stronger the power of nature the more rarely does it fail to achieve its effect--so too in that process of reason which is not accompanied by complete certitude certain levels are found accordingly as one approaches more or less to complete certitude. For although science is not obtained by this process of reason, nevertheless belief or opinion is sometimes achieved (on account of the provability of the propositions one starts with), because reason leans completely to one side of a contradiction but with fear concerning the other side. The Topics or dialectics is devoted to this. For the dialectical syllogism which Aristotle treats in the book of Topics proceeds from premises which are provable.

Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle Foreword p 3

At times, however, belief or opinion is not altogether achieved, but suspicion is, because reason does not lean to one side of a contradiction unreservedly, although it is inclined more to one side than to the other. To this the Rhetoric is devoted. At other times a mere fancy inclines one to one side of a contradiction because of some representation, much as a man turns in disgust from certain food if it is described to him in terms of something disgusting. And to this is ordained the Poetics. For the poet's task is to lead us to something virtuous by some excellent description. And all these pertain to the philosophy of the reason, for it belongs to reason to pass from one thing to another.

Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle Foreword p 3

The third process of reasoning is served by that part of logic which is called sophistry, which Aristotle treats in the book On Sophistical Refutations.

b. enters the religious sphere for God[base ']s purposing of evil against a sinful people, or for the purposing of evil against the Lord (cf. Jer. 18:8; Nah. 1:9, 11). Rather different is the reckoning of faith as righteousness in Gen. 15:6, the imputing of sin in Ps. 32:2, and cultic crediting in Lev. 7:18 and 17:4. In cultic imputing the basis is God[base ']s will but there is also something of the commercial sense of charging.

2. logismoés. The noun has the same basic senses as the verb but finds special applications in mathematics and logic. It thus comes to denote the supreme human function, with an ethical orientation in Stoicism. It is reason in its concrete form in the consciousness and as worked out in action. The law is its basis in 4 Maccabees. In the LXX the word also has the common sense of [base "]plan,[per thou] good when it is God[base ']s plan to save, but usually bad (Ezek. 38:10). In Wisdom it is self-vaunting reason apart from God (1:3).

B. The Word Group in the NT. Paul uses logiízesthai in all its nuances, though bending it to his own purposes, logismoés occurs only twice in Paul. In the rest of the NT logiízesthai is rare and weak, and logismoés is never used at all.

1. Thought Taken Captive to Christ. Paul expresses the popular philosophical idea of thought in his use of logismoés. In Rom. 2:15, where he stands on common ground with the diatribe, he has logismoés in a positive sense for the thoughts which, on the basis of moral law, either accuse or excuse. Its function, however, is only judicial. In 2 Cor. 10:4, where the logiízesthai of v. 2 is hostile to Paul and reflects an overestimation of reason, the situation is different. The logismoií are the thoughts of arrogant reason which can be subdued, not by reason[base ']s own weapons, but only by God[base ']s power as this is set forth at the cross (cf. Lk. 22:37 quoting Is. 53:12). The logismoií are not destroyed but reoriented to divine reality. Hence logiízesthai can become a term for the judgment of faith in Rom. 3:28; Phil. 3:13. This is an obedient logiízesthai in which we judge on the basis of the justifying efficacy of Christ[base ']s work (Rom. 3:28) or consider that present suffering is not to be compared with future glory (8:18). It is also unconditionally valid; there can be no objection when Paul thinks he is not inferior

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as an apostle (2 Cor. 11:5), or when he considers that he has not yet achieved perfection (Phil. 3:13), or when he calls us to consider that we are dead to sin and should act accordingly (Rom. 6:11), or even when the weak think things to be unclean (14:14).

2. logiízesthai in the Apostle[base ']s Ministry. In the estimation of his work in 2 Cor. 3:5 Paul uses logiízesthai in a broader sense than that of thought. As in 1 Cor. 13:11 and 2 Cor. 10:2, judgment involves commitment to action.

3. logiízesthai in the Community[base ']s Life. In Phil. 4:8 Paul is not asking for mere reflection but for the practical consideration that leads to action. The same applies in 1 Cor. 13:5, where what is at issue in this very un-Greek combination is not reflecting on a principle but living according to the fact of salvation (Phil. 2:5ff.). When Christ is normative, logiízesthai involves the power to live. It is not arbitrarily or aimlessly impelled to action, but unfolds in the community and comes to fulfilment in the edification of the community (1 Cor. 12 and 14).

4. logiízesthai as God[base ']s Saving Act.

a. God imputes faith (cf. Jms. 2:23; Rom. 4:3ff.; Gal. 3:6). This imputing sets up a relation between salvation and faith and raises the question of merit. In Gen. 15:6 God reckons faith as righteousness because he is pleased to do so and not because it has intrinsic worth. Yet a tendency develops, especially among the rabbis, to remove the judgment from God[base ']s personal will and turn it into general recognition. The Greek term logiízesthai fits in with this trend, for while it embraces the idea of imputation, it also carries with it the idea of recognition, which implies that faith is also a merit. Jms. 2:23 breaks with this trend by stressing, not the meritoriousness of faith, but its commitment to action. Paul makes an even more decisive break in Rom. 4:3ff., where he is plainly playing off the Hebraic logiízesthai of the LXX against the Greek use, as may be seen by his contrasting of gift and debt (v. 4). The presupposition here is that the very question why faith should be reckoned for righteousness is a false one unless an answer is sought in the grace of the cross. The point of faith is that in it believers subject themselves to divine judgment and mercy and are ready to live by divine grace. On the basis of the cross righteousness is now the true reality, so that this imputation is no fiction. The reality of God[base ']s assessment thus serves as a norm of action. Believers become new creatures by God[base ']s logiízesthai, which carries with it the imparting of the Spirit (Gal. 3:2ff.). Paul, then, restores Gen. 15:6 to its true sense, corrects the trend supported by the Greek sense of logiízesthai, and presents dikaiouén and logiízesthai as complementary terms whereby God the Judge is also God the Father.

b. The reverse side of the imputing of faith is the nonimputing of sin (Rom. 4:7-8; 2 Cor. 5:19; cf. Ps. 32:2). The intrusion of grace into divine justice offends the Greeks linguistically and the Jews materially. The cross is the point of union, for if God does not impute sin to us, it is because Christ has been made sin for us. logiízesthai is here again a judgment of grace, but it is the only connecting point between Gen. 15:6 and Ps. 32:2, for the imputing of faith obviously embraces much more than the nonimputing of sin. Justin Dialogue 141.2-3 rather misses the point when he suggests that repentance is the ground of nonimputation (cf. faith in 1 Clem. 10.6). [H. W. HEIDLAND, IV, 284[^]92]