Monday, January 23, 2006

Documents Tell of Brutal Improvisation by GIs Interrogated General's Sleeping-Bag Death, CIA's Use of Secret Iraqi Squad Are Among Details By Josh White Washington Post Staff Writer Wednesday, August 3, 2005 Iraqi Maj. Gen. Abed Hamed Mowhoush was being stubborn with his American captors, and a series of intense beatings and creative interrogation tactics were not enough to break his will. On the morning of Nov. 26, 2003, a U.S. Army interrogator and a military guard grabbed a green sleeping bag, stuffed Mowhoush inside, wrapped him in an electrical cord, laid him on the floor and began to go to work. Again. It was inside the sleeping bag that the 56-year-old detainee took his last breath through broken ribs, lying on the floor beneath a U.S. soldier in Interrogation Room 6 in the western Iraqi desert. Two days before, a secret CIA-sponsored group of Iraqi paramilitaries, working with Army interrogators, had beaten Mowhoush nearly senseless, using fists, a club and a rubber hose, according to classified documents. The sleeping bag was the idea of a soldier who remembered how his older brother used to force him into one, and how scared and vulnerable it made him feel. Senior officers in charge of the facility near the Syrian border believed that such "claustrophobic techniques" were approved ways to gain information from detainees, part of what military regulations refer to as a "fear up" tactic, according to military court documents. The circumstances that led up to Mowhoush's death paint a vivid example of how the pressure to produce intelligence for anti-terrorism efforts and the war in Iraq led U.S. military interrogators to improvise and develop abusive measures, not just at Abu Ghraib but in detention centers elsewhere in Iraq, in Afghanistan and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Mowhoush's ordeal in Qaim, over 16 days in November 2003, also reflects U.S. government secrecy surrounding some abuse cases and gives a glimpse into a covert CIA unit that was set up to foment rebellion before the war and took part in some interrogations during the insurgency. The sleeping-bag interrogation and beatings were taking place in Qaim about the same time that soldiers at Abu Ghraib, outside Baghdad, were using dogs to intimidate detainees, putting women's underwear on their heads, forcing them to strip in front of female soldiers and attaching at least one to a leash. It was a time when U.S. interrogators were coming up with their own tactics to get detainees to talk, many of which they considered logical interpretations of broad-brush categories in the Army Field Manual, with labels such as "fear up" or "pride and ego down" or "futility." Other tactics, such as some of those seen at Abu Ghraib, had been approved for one detainee at Guantanamo Bay and found their way to Iraq. Still others have been linked to official Pentagon guidance on specific techniques, such as the use of dogs. Two Army soldiers with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Fort Carson, Colo., are charged with killing Mowhoush with the sleeping-bag technique, and his death has been the subject of partially open court proceedings at the base in Colorado Springs. Two other soldiers alleged to have participated face potential nonjudicial punishment. Some details of the incident have been released and were previously reported. But an examination of numerous classified documents gathered during the criminal investigation into Mowhoush's death, and interviews with Defense Department officials and current and former intelligence officials, present a fuller picture of what happened and outline the role played in his interrogation by the CIA, its Iraqi paramilitaries and Special Forces soldiers. Determining the details of the general's demise has been difficult because the circumstances are listed as "classified" on his official autopsy, court records have been censored to hide the CIA's involvement in his questioning, and reporters have been removed from a Fort Carson courtroom when testimony relating to the CIA has surfaced. Despite Army investigators' concerns that the CIA and Special Forces soldiers also were involved in serious abuse leading up to Mowhoush's death, the investigators reported they did not have the authority to fully look into their actions. The CIA inspector general's office has launched an investigation of at least one CIA operative who identified himself to soldiers only as "Brian." The CIA declined to comment on the matter, as did an Army spokesman, citing the ongoing criminal cases. Although Mowhoush's death certificate lists his cause of death as "asphyxia due to smothering and chest compression," the Dec. 2, 2003, autopsy, quoted in classified documents and released with redactions, showed that Mowhoush had "contusions and abrasions with pattern impressions" over much of his body, and six fractured ribs. Investigators believed a "long straight-edge instrument" was used on Mowhoush, as well as an "object like the end of an M-16" rifle. "Although the investigation indicates the death was directly related to the non-standard interrogation methods employed on 26 NOV, the circumstances surrounding the death are further complicated due to Mowhoush being interrogated and reportedly beaten by members of a Special Forces team and other government agency (OGA) employees two days earlier," said a secret Army memo dated May 10, 2004. The Walk-In Hours after Mowhoush's death in U.S. custody on Nov. 26, 2003, military officials issued a news release stating that the prisoner had died of natural causes after complaining of feeling sick. Army psychological-operations officers quickly distributed leaflets designed to convince locals that the general had cooperated and outed key insurgents. The U.S. military initially told reporters that Mowhoush had been captured during a raid. In reality, he had walked into the Forward Operating Base "Tiger" in Qaim on Nov. 10, 2003, hoping to speak with U.S. commanders to secure the release of his sons, who had been arrested in raids 11 days earlier. Officials were excited about Mowhoush's appearance. The general, they believed, had been a high-ranking official in Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard and a key supporter of the insurgency in northwestern Iraq. Mowhoush was one of a few generals whom Hussein had given "execution authority," U.S. commanders believed, meaning that he could execute someone on sight, and he had been notorious among Shiites in southern Iraq for brutality. Mowhoush had been visited by Hussein at his home in Sadah in October 2003 "to discuss, among other undisclosed issues, a bounty of US$10,000 to anyone who video-taped themselves attacking coalition forces," according to a Defense Intelligence Agency report. Military intelligence also believed that Mowhoush was behind several attacks in the Qaim area. After being taken into custody, Mowhoush was housed in an isolated area of the Qaim base within miles of the Syrian border, according to a situation summary prepared by interrogators. The heavyset and imposing man was moderately cooperative in his first days of detention. He told interrogators that he was the commander of the al Quds Golden Division, an organization of trusted loyalists fueling the insurgency with mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, sniper rifles, machine guns and other small arms. In the months before Mowhoush's detention, military intelligence officials across Iraq had been discussing interrogation tactics, expressing a desire to ramp things up and expand their allowed techniques to include more severe methods, such as beatings that did not leave permanent damage, and exploiting detainees' fear of dogs and snakes, according to documents released by the Army. Officials in Baghdad wrote an e-mail to interrogators in the field on Aug. 14, 2003, stating that the "gloves are coming off" and asking them to develop "wish lists" of tactics they would like to use. An interrogator with the 66th Military Intelligence Company, who was assigned to work on Mowhoush, wrote back with suggestions in August, including the use of "close confinement quarters," sleep deprivation and using the fear of dogs, adding: "I firmly agree that the gloves need to come off." Another e-mail exchange from interrogators with the 4th Infantry Division based in Tikrit also suggested "close quarter confinement" in extremely claustrophobic situations, because "discomfort induces compliance and cooperation." Taking the Gloves Off A week into Mowhoush's detainment, according to classified investigative documents, interrogators were getting fed up with the prisoner. In a "current situation summary" PowerPoint presentation dated Nov. 18, Army officials wrote about his intransigence, using his first name (spelled "Abid" in Army documents): "Previous interrogations were non-threatening; Abid was being treated very well. Not anymore," the document reads. "The interrogation session lasted several hours and I took the gloves off because Abid refused to play ball." But the harsher tactics backfired. In an interrogation that could be witnessed by the entire detainee population, Mowhoush was put into an undescribed "stress position" that caused the other detainees to stand "with heads bowed and solemn looks on their faces," said the document. "I asked Abid if he was strong enough a leader to put an end to the attacks that I believed he was behind," the document said, quoting an unidentified interrogator. "He did not deny he was behind the attacks as he had denied previously, he simply said because I had humiliated him, he would not be able to stop the attacks. I take this as an admission of guilt." Three days later, on Nov. 21, 2003, Mowhoush was moved from the border base at Qaim to a makeshift detention facility about six miles away in the Iraqi desert, a prison fashioned out of an old train depot, according to court testimony and investigative documents. Soldiers with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 101st Airborne Division were running a series of massive raids called Operation Rifles Blitz, and the temporary holding facility, nicknamed Blacksmith Hotel, was designed to hold the quarry. U.S. troops searched more than 8,000 homes in three cities, netting 350 detainees, according to court testimony. Even though Mowhoush was not arrested during the raids, he was moved to Blacksmith Hotel, where teams of Army Special Forces soldiers and the CIA were conducting interrogations. At Blacksmith, according to military sources, there was a tiered system of interrogations. Army interrogators were the first level. When Army efforts produced nothing useful, detainees would be handed over to members of Operational Detachment Alpha 531, soldiers with the 5th Special Forces Group, the CIA or a combination of the three. "The personnel were dressed in civilian clothes and wore balaclavas to hide their identity," according to a Jan. 18, 2004, report for the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division. If they did not get what they wanted, the interrogators would deliver the detainees to a small team of the CIA-sponsored Iraqi paramilitary squads, code-named Scorpions, according to a military source familiar with the operation. The Jan. 18 memo indicates that it was "likely that indigenous personnel in the employ of the CIA interrogated MG Mowhoush." Sometimes, soldiers and intelligence officers used the mere existence of the paramilitary unit as a threat to induce detainees to talk, one Army soldier said in an interview. "Detainees knew that if they went to those people, bad things would happen," the soldier said. "It was used as a motivator to get them to talk. They didn't want to go with the masked men." The Scorpions went by nicknames such as Alligator and Cobra. They were set up by the CIA before the war to conduct light sabotage. After the fall of Baghdad, they worked with their CIA handlers to infiltrate the insurgency and as interpreters, according to military investigative documents, defense officials, and former and current intelligence officials. Soon after Mowhoush's detention began, soldiers in charge of him "reached a collective decision that they would try using the [redacted] who would, you know, obviously spoke the local, native Iraqi Arabic as a means of trying to shake Mowhoush up, and that the other thing that they were going to try to do was put a bunch of people in the room, a tactic that Mr. [redacted] called 'fear up,' " Army Special Agent Curtis Ryan, who investigated the case, testified, according to a transcript. Classified e-mail messages and reports show that "Brian," a Special Forces retiree, worked as a CIA operative with the Scorpions. On Nov. 24, the CIA and one of its four-man Scorpion units interrogated Mowhoush, according to investigative records. "OGA Brian and the four indig were interrogating an unknown detainee," according to a classified memo, using the slang "other government agency" for the CIA and "indig" for indigenous Iraqis. "When he didn't answer or provided an answer that they didn't like, at first [redacted] would slap Mowhoush, and then after a few slaps, it turned into punches," Ryan testified. "And then from punches, it turned into [redacted] using a piece of hose." "The indig were hitting the detainee with fists, a club and a length of rubber hose," according to classified investigative records. Soldiers heard Mowhoush "being beaten with a hard object" and heard him "screaming" from down the hall, according to the Jan. 18, 2004, provost marshal's report. The report said four Army guards had to carry Mowhoush back to his cell. Two days later, at 8 a.m., Nov. 26, Mowhoush -- prisoner No. 76 -- was brought, moaning and breathing hard, to Interrogation Room 6, according to court testimony. Chief Warrant Officer Lewis E. Welshofer Jr. did a first round of interrogations for 30 minutes, taking a 15-minute break and resuming at 8:45. According to court testimony, Welshofer and Spec. Jerry L. Loper, a mechanic assuming the role of guard, put Mowhoush into the sleeping bag and wrapped the bag in electrical wire. Welshofer allegedly crouched over Mowhoush's chest to talk to him. Sgt. 1st Class William Sommer, a linguist, stood nearby. Chief Warrant Officer Jeff Williams, an intelligence analyst, came to observe progress. Investigative records show that Mowhoush "becomes unresponsive" at 9:06 a.m. Medics tried to resuscitate him for 30 minutes before pronouncing him dead. In a preliminary court hearing in March for Williams, Loper and Sommer, retired Chief Warrant Officer Richard Manwaring, an interrogator who worked with Welshofer in Iraq, testified that using the sleeping bag and putting detainees in a wall locker and banging on it were "appropriate" techniques that he himself used to frighten detainees and make them tense. Col. David A. Teeples, who then commanded the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, told the court he believed the "claustrophobic technique" was both approved and effective. It was used before, and for some time after, Mowhoush's death, according to sources familiar with the interrogation operation. "My thought was that the death of Mowhoush was brought about by [redacted] and then it was unfortunate and accidental, what had happened under an interrogation by our people," Teeples said in court, according to a transcript. The CIA has tried hard to conceal the existence of the Scorpions. CIA classification officials have monitored pretrial hearings in the case and have urged the court to close much of the hearing on national security grounds. Redacted transcripts were released only after lawyers for the Denver Post challenged the rulings. Autopsy Shields CIA The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology's standard "Autopsy Examination Report" of Mowhoush's death was manipulated to avoid references to the CIA. In contrast to the other autopsy reports of suspicious detainee deaths released by the Army, Mowhoush's name is redacted and under "Circumstances of Death," the form says: "This Iraqi [redacted] died while in U.S. custody. The details surrounding the circumstances at the time of death are classified." Williams was arraigned yesterday on a murder charge and is scheduled for court-martial in November, a Fort Carson spokeswoman said. Welshofer's court-martial is set for October. Loper and Sommer have not been referred for trial. Commanders are still considering what, if any, punishment to impose. Frank Spinner, an attorney for Welshofer, said his client is going to fight the murder charge. Reading from a statement prepared by Welshofer during his Article 32 hearing this spring, Spinner quoted his client as saying that he is proud of the job he did and that his efforts saved U.S. soldiers' lives. "I did not torture anyone," Spinner quoted him as saying. William Cassara, who represents Williams, cited Mowhoush's brutal encounters in the days before he died as possibly leading to his death. He said Williams, who was not trained in interrogation tactics, had little to do with the case. "The interrogation techniques were known and were approved of by the upper echelons of command of the 3rd ACR," Cassara said in a news conference. "They believed, and still do, that they were appropriate and proper." Staff writer Dana Priest contributed to this report. 2:07:52 PM    comment []

Does Bush Know Jack? Fox News is alone in placing "Reception Line Photos" above an AP report that photographs of the president and Jack Abramoff together were seen by Time and the Washingtonian, which says that if asked, Abramoff would tell prosecutors Bush "knew the names of Abramoff's children and asked about them during their meetings." [Cursor.org] 10:46:40 AM    comment []

Explaining 'Why Hillary Won't Save Us,' Molly Ivins wonders "What kind of courage does it take, for mercy's sake," to take "a clear stand on the war in Iraq"? [Cursor.org] 10:45:25 AM    comment []

Halliburton reportedly disputes allegations "made by its own employees and documented in company e-mails," that it failed to inform troops and civilians at a U.S. base in Iraq that they were using water contaminated with raw sewage for "handwashing, laundry, bathing and making coffee." [Cursor.org] 10:44:22 AM    comment []

The number of Pentagon TALON reports containing "names of U.S. persons" observed at "more than 1,500 'suspicious incidents'" reportedly "could be in the thousands," as "a Pentagon spokesman declined to say why a private company like Halliburton would be deserving" of domestic "force protection." [Cursor.org] 10:42:59 AM    comment []

Media is a Plural - Rory O'Connor's blog Able Danger II How much longer will Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld be able to ignore the growing clamor in Congress over the Able Danger [OE]information warfare[base '] controversy? Rumsfeld never responded to letters regarding the matter sent weeks ago by House Armed Services Committee heads Duncan Hunter and Curt Weldon. Now Weldon has secured the signatures of hundreds of colleagues from both sides of the aisle to yet another letter demanding that Rumsfeld allow Able Danger whistleblowers like Lieutenant Colonel Tony Shaffer to tell the story of how they identified Mohamed Atta and other 9/11 hijackers a year before the worst terror attacks ever on US soil. As the latest letter to Rumsfeld notes, [base "]Until this point, congressional efforts to investigate ABLE DANGER have been obstructed by Department of Defense insistence that certain individuals with knowledge of ABLE DANGER be prevented from freely and frankly testifying in an open hearing.[per thou] Weldon contends Shaffer and others have been silenced [^] and Shaffer smeared [^] by the Defense Department in an effort to cover up key aspects of the massive data-mining intelligence project. DOD[base ']s objection to open testimony by Shaffer, Navy Captain Scott Phillpott and other Able Danger principals is said to stem from security concerns. But as the letter to Rumsfeld notes, [base "]Testimony from the appropriate individuals in an open hearing on ABLE DANGER would not only fail to jeopardize national security, but would in fact enhance it over the long term,[per thou] since [base "]America can only better prepare itself against future attacks if it understands the full scope of its past failures to do so.[per thou] The controversy came to a head two months ago, when the Senate Judiciary Committee conducted a hearing at which Shaffer, Phillpott and the others were not permitted to testify as scheduled. Representative Weldon spoke on their behalf, however, basing his testimony on information obtained directly from them. Since Acting Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight William Dugan certified that the hearings did not reveal any classified information, it remains unclear what testimony from the Able Danger whistleblowers [^] who tried without success to bring their findings to the attention of both the FBI and the 9/11 Commissioners charged with investigating the attacks [^] would jeopardize. Since basic elements of the Able Danger project are already well known, why is Rumsfeld so intent on forestalling public inquiry? Continued refusal to allow Able Danger participants to testify in an open congressional hearing, the letter to Rumsfeld notes, [base "]can only lead us to conclude that the Department of Defense is uncomfortable with the prospect of Members of Congress questioning these individuals about the circumstances surrounding Able Danger. This would suggest not a concern for national security, but rather an attempt to prevent potentially embarrassing facts from coming to light.[per thou] This interpretation is consistent with that offered by Representative Weldon, in his many media appearances on the subject, as he puts forth the well-known bureaucratic imperative known as CYA ([OE]covering your ass[base ']) as the best explanation. But others close to the investigation suggest a different motive for DOD[base ']s intransigence: the lingering possibility that a copy of the missing and presumed destroyed Able Danger data set may yet come to light. Although Tony Shaffer, Scott Phillpott, and the other key Able Danger participants remain constrained from speaking out on what they know, if given the chance they may well expose at least one as-yet untold piece of the puzzle: [OE]Able Danger II.[base '] A source familiar with the situation but barred from speaking out says [OE]Able Danger II[base '] was created when the US Army[base ']s Land Information Warfare Activity unit (LIWA) [base "]backed out[per thou] of the original Able Danger program in early 2000. The US Army Special Operation Command (SOCOM), which along with LIWA and private contractors was involved in the first Able Danger operation, then funded an effort to move the program from its headquarters in Tampa, Florida to a secret [OE]black[base '] facility in Garland, Texas. In addition to Scott Phillpott and Tony Shaffer, other Able Danger participants (including an Army Lieutenant Colonel who was his Shaffer[base ']s deputy, and a Reserve Major who was called to active duty to help) were deployed to work in the Garland facility. This unit, known as Stratus Ivy, provided basic support necessary to allow for the [base "]intelligence mechanisms[per thou] to function from the Garland site. A cover plan was devised, and in addition to helping to get the plan approved and providing manpower, the unit provided the Able Danger team with clandestine Internet capabilities to help perform [base "]non traceable/non attributable[per thou] searches for the most sensitive data. Shaffer also served, while a reserve major on active duty, as one of the [base "]planners[per thou] inside the facility. Although DOD spokesmen report the Defense Intelligence Agency cannot find any information about the Garland unit in its files, several DIA analysts and officials toured the facility between August 2000 and January 2001. One, then chief of the Transnational Warfare Group, sent an aide to Garland in what was perceived by some as an attempt to undermine the ongoing effort in order [base "]to buy time for them to create their own Able Danger-type capability,[per thou] as a source explained. The Garland facility, run by defense contractor Raytheon, is among those facilities, informally known as [base "]skunk works,[per thou] that are run by private contractors but used for clandestine government-related security programs. A special additional clearance from the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is necessary even to enter. Along with Dr. Eileen Preisser, who worked on re-creating the original LIWA suite of tools and technology used in Able Danger data mining, Dr. Robert Johnson was the primary scientist working on the effort at Raytheon[base ']s Garland unit. Johnson is the son of Representative Sam Johnson, Republican of Texas, whose congressional district includes Garland. Johnson is among those who signed the latest letter to Rumsfeld, but his office declined to comment about the letter, the Garland facility, or his son[base ']s involvement in the affair. Nevertheless, it is known that in the summer of 2000, Robert Johnson reported to Congress that LIWA was destroying Able Danger data. This resulted in Representative Dan Burton, Republican from Indiana, issuing subpoenas to get it. As a result, much of the data was saved [^] at least at first. Since there was not enough room in the congressional warehouse in Suitland, Maryland much of it was left with DOD in its storage facility in Crystal City, Virginia. The data resided there until someone apparently destroyed it without permission within the past year. Robert Johnson was unavailable for comment. But a colleague described his involvement in the project as [base "]great - very insightful and helpful. He knew what we were trying to do and provided great assistance.[per thou] Although very little of the original 2.5 terabytes of information was transferred from LIWA to Garland, once operations there started in earnest, the original databases were recreated, and the information concerning Mohamed Atta was discovered again, along with information relating to other 9/11 terrorists. Asked by investigators about Able Danger II and its findings, Johnson told two different stories, according to a Congressional source. [base "]Originally, Johnson said he did recall that Atta was found in their new data runs in the fall of 2000,[per thou] says the source. [base "]Subsequently he said he is not so sure.[per thou] Given the enormous pressure brought to bear on Tony Shaffer and others who have tried to alert authorities about Able Danger, says the source, [base "]It[base ']s not surprising that Johnson is having second thoughts. After what they[base ']ve done to Shaffer, who would want to get out in front about this?[per thou] [base "]There IS a paper trail on all of this,[per thou] another source close to the investigation maintains. [base "]The question is whether anyone still inside the Pentagon will permit it to come out. It is not classified at this point, but they will probably hide behind [base ']security[base '] as the reason they will not give up the info. [base "]There may be one database left of the information - that is what I[base ']ve heard,[per thou] he continues. [base "]I know that there is a quiet search for information as we speak. I[base ']m convinced that someone has gone back and attempted to cover all the tracks at the Pentagon - they[base ']ve know this was coming far too long to have done nothing - so I[base ']m personally not sure the data will ever be found.[per thou] Given the groundswell of congressional support, there is a chance of new Able Danger hearings when Congress returns next year from Christmas recess. Meanwhile, Representative Weldon says he has been given a guarantee by Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England that DIA will [base "]reinstate[per thou] Tony Shaffer [^] who is currently on extended [OE]administrative leave[per thou] - at least while the DOD Inspector General investigates charges that the agency has improperly gagged and smeared the veteran of twenty two years of military service. Meanwhile, Able Danger continues to its inexorable ascent into the mainstream media. Former FBI chief Louis Freeh has now joined those injecting the matter into public discourse [^] first in an appearance on Meet the Press, and most recently in the Wall Street Journal where he wrote: [base "]The Able Danger intelligence, if confirmed, is undoubtedly the most relevant fact of the entire post-9/11 inquiry.[per thou] As Tony Shaffer wrote recently in an email sent to his supporters, [base "]No one to date has ever been held accountable for the failures that allowed the 9/11 terrorists to conduct a successful attack - yet there is growing evidence (beyond Able Danger) that the clues of the pending attack was very much within the U.S. Government[base ']s grasp - but that the various bureaucrats within the intelligence and law enforcement community failed to act. Many of the very same people who made the pre-9/11 bad decisions remain in place - making the same bad decisions now. Plus the 9/11 Commission may not have [OE]connected the dots[base '] as completely as they could and should have - and that is my concern - and the concern of others working this issue - what else have we missed? Where else are we vulnerable? Was there an effort to ignore specific information? Why is there the appearance of a cover-up?[per thou] Good questions all. Isn[base ']t it time for some answers, Mr. Rumsfeld? - - - - - - - - - - - - Editor[base ']s note: Raw Story has joined Media Is A Plural, MediaChannel, and the growing number of web sites and other outlets investigating the Able Danger cover up. A recent post offers a good explanation of the background of the story thus far: Background Able Danger, an open-source data-mining operation charged with identifying and targeting members of Al-Qaeda, was created in October 1999 upon the request of then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Hugh Shelton. The program made front page news and generated controversy in August in the wake of claims made by former members of the group that they had successfully identified Atta over a year prior to the attack. The operation also identified Marwan Al-Sheehi, the man believed to be the pilot of United Flight 175, which crashed into the South Tower; Nawaf Al-Hazmi, the man believed to be one of the hijackers of American Airlines flight 77, which crashed into the Pentagon, and Khalid Al-Mihdhar, believed to have been involved in hijacking the same flight. Charts, data and documentation from the program were destroyed in 2000 and 2004. The program itself was reportedly terminated in early 2001 after Able Danger liaison Lt. Col. Shaffer briefed General Shelton at one meeting and Defense Intelligence Agency Director Admiral Wilson, General Counsel Richard L. Shiffrin and then-Special Advisor to the Secretary of Defense, Stephen Cambone, at another. Cambone was later appointed by Douglas Feith to serve as Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence. During the final months of the Clinton administration, the officers say Able Danger made three attempts to present their findings to the FBI, each aborted by Pentagon lawyers. They also claim they raised alarm two weeks prior to the October 12, 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole, and that their warning never reached the ship. On Sept. 25, 2001, just two weeks after the 9/11 attacks, Weldon, Rep. Dan Burton (R-IN) and Chairman of the House Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and Emerging Threats Christopher Shays (R-CT) met at the White House with then-Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley. Weldon initially said he showed Hadley a copy of one of the charts generated by Able Danger, and left it for Hadley to show to the President. When asked about the meeting this past September, Hadley spokesman Frederick L. Jones II said, [base "]Mr. Hadley does not recall any chart bearing the name or photo of Mohamed Atta.[per thou] Former 9/11 Commissioners, responding to a series of reports in the New York Times and elsewhere, varied their recollection of events a number of times before releasing a formal written statement saying that the program was [base "]historically insignificant[per thou] and that they could find no evidence that the program had identified Atta. There is no mention of Able Danger in the 9/11 Report. Weldon expressed outrage at the Commission[base ']s failure to examine Able Danger at a press conference last Friday insisting that [base "]there was a deliberate attempt to not have their story told to the American people. There has been nothing but denial and spin since the story broke in the first week of August. The Commission has no credibility on this issue whatsoever.[per thou] Shays told CQ Weekly Aug. 12, [base "]If this wasn[base ']t reported by the Commission, what else wasn[base ']t reported?[per thou] Pentagon identifies, gags [OE]witnesses[base '] An informal inquiry by the Pentagon identified several additional witnesses who confirmed that in fact the program had identified Atta and three other eventual 9/11 hijackers. Fully a third (5 of 15) core team members including the team[base ']s leader, Captain Scott Phillpott (set to take command of a Navy Destroyer in January,) have corrorobated the claims of Lt. Col Shaffer, insisting publicly and in interviews with Pentagon investigators that their data mining efforts yielded the names and photos of four of the 19 hijackers, including Mohamed Atta. Article printed from Media is a Plural Article URL: http://www.roryoconnor.org/blog/index.php?p=150 10:40:32 AM    comment []

Halliburton Cited in Iraq Contamination By Larry Margasak The Associated Press Sunday 22 January 2006 Sen. Byron Dorgan (D-ND) speaks to members of the North Dakota House of Representatives at the Capitol in Bismarck, ND, in this January 31, 2005, file photo. Dorgan is scheduled to chair a Senate Democrats hearing on the alleged supplying of contaminated water to American troops in Iraq. (Photo: Will Kincaid / AP Photo) Washington - Troops and civilians at a U.S. military base in Iraq were exposed to contaminated water last year and employees for the responsible contractor, Halliburton, couldn't get their company to inform camp residents, according to interviews and internal company documents. Halliburton, the company formerly headed by Vice President Dick Cheney, disputes the allegations about water problems at Camp Junction City, in Ramadi, even though they were made by its own employees and documented in company e-mails. "We exposed a base camp population (military and civilian) to a water source that was not treated," said a July 15, 2005, memo written by William Granger, the official for Halliburton's KBR subsidiary who was in charge of water quality in Iraq and Kuwait. "The level of contamination was roughly 2x the normal contamination of untreated water from the Euphrates River," Granger wrote in one of several documents. The Associated Press obtained the documents from Senate Democrats who are holding a public inquiry into the allegations Monday. Sen. Byron Dorgan, D-N.D., who will chair the session, held a number of similar inquiries last year on contracting abuses in Iraq. He said Democrats were acting on their own because they had not been able to persuade Republican committee chairmen to investigate. The company's former water treatment expert at Camp Junction City said that he discovered the problem last March, a statement confirmed by his e-mail the day after he tested the water. While bottled water was available for drinking, the contaminated water was used for virtually everything else, including handwashing, laundry, bathing and making coffee, said water expert Ben Carter of Cedar City, Utah. Another former Halliburton employee who worked at the base, Ken May of Louisville, said there were numerous instances of diarrhea and stomach cramps - problems he also suffered. A spokeswoman for Halliburton said its own inspection found neither contaminated water nor medical evidence to substantiate reports of illnesses at the base. The company now operates its own water treatment plant there, spokeswoman Melissa Norcross said. A military medical unit that visited Camp Ramadi in mid-April found nothing out of the ordinary in terms of water quality, said Marine Corps Maj. Tim Keefe, a military spokesman. Water-quality testing records from May 23 show the water within normal parameters, he said. "The allegations appear not to have merit," Keefe said. Halliburton has contracts to provide a number of services to U.S. forces in Iraq and was responsible for the water quality at the base in Ramadi. Granger's July 15 memo said the exposure had gone on for "possibly a year" and added, "I am not sure if any attempt to notify the exposed population was ever made." The first memo on the problem - written by Carter to Halliburton officials on March 24, 2005 - was an "incident report" from tests Carter performed the previous day. "It is my opinion that the water source is without question contaminated with numerous micro-organisms, including Coliform bacteria," Carter wrote. "There is little doubt that raw sewage is routinely dumped upstream of intake much less than the required 2 mile distance. "Therefore, it is my conclusion that chlorination of our water tanks while certainly beneficial is not sufficient protection from parasitic exposure." Carter said he resigned in early April after Halliburton officials did not take any action to inform the camp population. The water expert said he told company officials at the base that they would have to notify the military. "They told me it was none of my concern and to keep my mouth shut," he said. On at least one occasion, Carter said, he spoke to the chief military surgeon at the base, asking him whether he was aware of stomach problems afflicting people. He said the surgeon told him he would look into it. "They brushed it under the carpet," Carter said. "I told everyone, 'Don't take showers, use bottled water." A July 14, 2005, memo showed that Halliburton's public relations department knew of the problem. "I don't want to turn it into a big issue right now," staff member Jennifer Dellinger wrote in the memo, "but if we end up getting some media calls I want to make sure we have all the facts so we are ready to respond." Halliburton's performance in Iraq has been criticized in a number of military audits, and congressional Democrats have contended that the Bush administration has favored the company with noncompetitive contracts. 10:34:26 AM    comment []

Bush sees wiretaps as political asset. Bush sees wiretaps as political asset [The Raw Story | A rational voice - Alternative news] 10:33:01 AM    comment []

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