A recent product announcement from Sun Microsystems (SunFLASH Vol 62 #8,
4 February 1994) introduces "new microphone, SunMicrophone II, to ship
with current and new Sun desktop platforms". Among the features
described by the announcement for this "uni-directional microphone
which allows greater focus on direct voice input while providing less
interference from background ambient noise" is the following Q&A:
Q. Does the SunMicrophone II look similar to the SunMicrophone?
A. No, the two products look very different. The current SunMicrophone
has a unique square shape, with an on/off switch. The SunMicrophone II
looks like a classic microphone on a rectangular stand, with no
on/off switch. Both products come in Sun colors and with Sun logo.
So, the new, "improved" model has no "on/off" switch, although the old
one did. Maybe the new microphone is "uni-directional", but that
doesn't mean it can't pick up ambient sound--just turn up the gain.
This "improvement" makes it all the more difficult to follow the final
recommendation of CERT Advisory CA-93:15 (21 October 1993), quoted in
part below. It's bad enough that the problem existed in the first
place, but Sun has now made it worse!
III. /dev/audio Vulnerability
This vulnerability affects all Sun systems with microphones. ...
A. Description
/dev/audio is set to a default mode of 666. There is also no
indication to the user of the system that the microphone is on.
B. Impact
Any user with access to the system can eavesdrop on conversations
held in the vicinity of the microphone.
C. Solution
[...]
*** Any site seriously concerned about the security risks
associated with the microphone should either switch off the
microphone, or unplug the microphone to prevent unauthorized
listening. ***
Even if this vulnerability is fixed from a systems viewpoint, a user is
still vulnerable to Trojan horse programs that exploit the user's own
(legitimate) access to the microphone--and the information discussed in
a person's office may be far more sensitive than the information stored
on an office computer.
This is especially a problem for multi-level secure (MLS) systems. Although
MLS systems offer protection against disclosure of information by Trojan horse
programs, that's no help at all if the microphone picks up a Top Secret
conversation that occurs in the office while the user happens to be logged in
at Unclassified. Sure--one might look around to be sure there's nobody who
can inadvertently overhear, or close the office door--but the computer?
Computers don't eavesdrop, do they?
Computer manufacturers need to address these risks. It's certainly
nifty to have desktop audio- and video-conferencing, but not when that
equivalent to installing a bug in every office (and remember not to aim
your video camera at the whiteboard).
Every microphone and video camera should have a positive on/off switch and
some positive indication (such as a light) to show when it's actually in use
(as opposed to just being enabled by the on/off switch). The broadcast
industry learned this years ago, with its "ON THE AIR" lights. Fail-safes,
such as permitting only manual activation, but computer deactivation, or
requiring manual confirmation of any attempted activation, would be better
still.
Olin Sibert |Internet: Sibert@Oxford.COM
Oxford Systems, Inc. |UUCP: uunet!oxford!sibert [Olin Sibert via risks-digest Volume 15, Issue 55]
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G!