|
 |
Wednesday, December 18, 2002 |
|
Thursday, December 05, 2002 |
"United Learns Size Isn't Everything", WSJ December 5 2002.
[Categories: Airlines, Costs, Demand, Game Theory (Commitment)]
P.S. Commitment piece is at the end, about United having little cash perhaps as a bargaining tactic to induce unions to accept less pay.
1:44:20 PM 
|
|
|
Friday, November 08, 2002 |
"Airbus is Set to Give Final Nod for Superjumbo Jet", WSJ December 19, 2000.
"Airbus Comes of Age with A-380 Super-Jumbo Jet Challenges Boeing's Last Monopoly", USA Today June 21, 2001.
"Boeing Weighing Speed and Efficiency in Deciding Newest Plane", Associated Press November 7, 2002.
Summary: Airbus' super-jumbo has received numerous orders. Boeing appears to have backed off from competing directly against Airbus' super-jumbo, instead favoring a smaller plane that will greater distances. According to Boeing, this plane may also be much faster (as in the Sonic Cruiser idea) or just super-fuel efficient. (See most recent AP article.)
[Categories: Airlines, Demand, Game Theory (first-mover, threats & commitments), Market Definition]
3:52:25 PM
|
|
Imports to the West Coast ground to a halt in late September 2002 as the dispute between dock owners and the ILWU grew heated as owners shut down the docks. A federal judge ordered a 60-day colling off period in which workers were required to return to work. Shortly thereafter, the main issue of contention appeared to be resolved: and "West Coast Ports Set Tentative Deal", WSJ November 4, 2002.
If the dock owners were able to make a truly take-it-or-leave-it offer, would the ILWU have accepted a deal in which new technologies are introduced and new technology jobs are non-unionized? If the ILWU were able to make a truly take-it-or-leave-it offer, would the dock owners have been willing to accept a deal in which no new technology is ever introduced? My own opinion is that the dock owners truly required that the new technologies be introduced, so in fact the final deal is very close to their outside option, i.e. the union was the big "winner". (In terms of our class game, they offered the owners only $1 and the owners accepted.)
How could the parties come to agreement -- with the union victorious -- so quickly after a judge forced the workers back to work? Which of the following helped the union and which (if any) helped the owners: (i) Christmas, (ii) 60-day limit to cooling-off period, (iii) AFL-CIO involvement?
[Categories: Game Theory]
2:14:17 PM
|
|
|
Sunday, October 27, 2002 |
"United They Fall", WSJ, October 21 2002. Apologies the salary table didn't come out well. Bottom line: United pilots make from $129K -- $306K, others such as Northwest pay from $100K -- $220K, Southwest pays from $87K to $152K, and at the bottom American Trans Air pays from $46K to $110K.
Why does the pilot's union at Northwest gain bargaining strength when United decides to pay its pilots more? After all, the Northwest pilots aren't likely to be able to switch over to United.
[Categories: Airlines, Costs, Game Theory]
12:12:36 PM
|
|
"Industrial Gases: Pressure Builds in Recession" and 'The Middle East: Natural Advantages Fuel Increasing Investment", Financial Times Special Section: The Business of Chemicals, October 14 2002.
First article: As we learned in class, one potential advantage of servicing is that it provides a means to meter customer consumption and hence to price disriminate through a two-part tariff. Is this feature important, do you think, to industrial gas providers, say, supplying bars and clubs?
[Categories: Price Discrimination]
Second article: Apparently, the Middle East commitment to expand capacity has deterred others from expanding. Can we conclude, then, that expected future gas prices given the Middle Eastern expansion are lower than what would be necessary to justify present investment by other, higher cost producers? What if the Middle East had a smaller cost advantage? Could they still deter expansion by others in the face of expected high future prices?
[Categories: Costs, Game Theory]
11:58:25 AM
|
|
© Copyright 2002 David McAdams.
|
|
|
