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Monday, July 28, 2003

Re: Insiders Suggest Rice Could Leave

Dear Friends:

The pressure about the authenticity of the claim that Iraq was buying nuclear bomb material is finally beginning to include Condoleezza Rice, and there are rumors that she could be leaving the administration soon. Karl Rove wants her head to roll, and he's been suspected of planting leaks with a favored journalist quoting unnamed insiders who would like her to disappear. This new "whisper" by Paul Bedard of US News & World Report is that there's growing talk by insiders that she may take the blame [for Yellowcake-gate] and resign. And, to make the job even easier, there's even a suggested list of her replacements: former Bush administration National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, NASA chief and former Navy Secretary Sean O'Keefe, and Paul Bremer, the U.S. administrator in Iraq.

She certainly won't be missed by us. ________________________________

US News & World Report Monday, July 28, 2003

Washington Whispers: Insiders suggest Condoleezza Rice could leave by Paul Bedard

As White House officials try to control the latest fallout over President Bush's flawed suggestion in the State of the Union address that Iraq was buying nuclear bomb materials, there's growing talk by insiders that National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice may take the blame and resign. For most insiders, it's inconceivable that Rice, touted as a future secretary of state, California governor, and even vice president, would go, but the latest revelations that her shop and deputy Stephen Hadley mishandled CIA warnings have put the NSC in the bull's eye of controversy.

While it's unclear how serious the talk is inside the administration about the future of Rice or Hadley with the NSC, a few top aides are already suggesting replacements for Rice. They include former Bush administration National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, NASA chief and former Navy Secretary Sean O'Keefe, and Paul Bremer, the U.S. administrator in Iraq.

In peace,

Otoño ________________________________

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10:36:57 AM

Re: Three-Minute Rice

Dear Friends:

The fallout from the false claim that Iraq was receiving materials from Niger to develop weapons of mass destruction is beginning to strike home. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice was once rumored as a possible successor to Colin Powell as secretary of state, but it looks as if her star has eclipsed and she's on the way out. "If Condi didn't know the exact state of intelligence on Saddam's nuclear programme she wasn't doing her job," Michael O'Hanlon, a public policy analyst said. "This was foreign policy priority number one for the administration last summer, so the claim that someone else should have done her homework for her is unconvincing." Maybe the dog ate it. _______________________________

The Independent (UK) July 28, 2003

Rice Under Fire Over Niger claims by Andrew Buncombe in Washington

As the row over false intelligence used by the White House continues to rage in Washington, questions are being asked about the role of Condoleezza Rice, George Bush's national security adviser.

Just weeks ago, Ms Rice was being mooted as likely successor to Colin Powell, the Secretary of State. But some say her role in the Niger uranium debacle has damaged her candidature.

Ms Rice has survived largely unscathed during the row about whether the White House knowingly made false accusations about Iraq's attempts to develop weapons of mass destruction as it prepared to go to war. She defended President Bush, claiming that his State of the Union address on 28 January, which included a false claim that Saddam was seeking to obtain uranium from Africa, had been approved by the CIA.

But in a front-page article published yesterday by The Washington Post, questions were raised about how much Ms Rice knew and to what extent she has told the truth.

"If Condi didn't know the exact state of intelligence on Saddam's nuclear programme she wasn't doing her job," Michael O'Hanlon, a public policy analyst said. "This was foreign policy priority number one for the administration last summer, so the claim that someone else should have done her homework for her is unconvincing."

Although the CIA director George Tenet has assumed responsibility for approving the State of the Union address, it emerged last week that the agency had previously sent two memos to the White House warning that the Niger claim could not be substantiated. Officials said Ms Rice had been briefed on these doubts.

Democrats are seeking to seize on Ms Rice's apparent errors. Henry Waxman, a congressman who has led calls for a full investigation, said: "If the national security adviser didn't understand the repeated State Department and CIA warnings about the uranium allegations, that's a frightful level of incompetence.

"It's even more serious if she knew and ignored the intelligence warnings and has deliberately misled our nation. In any case it's hard to see why the President or the public will have any confidence in her." White House officials claimed the President continues to have faith in Ms Rice, but one person close to her told the newspaper: "She knows she did badly by him and he knows that she knows it."

In peace,

Otoño ________________________________

Dear Friends:

Is she incompetent or is she a liar? We just can't resist featuring one more article about Condoleeza Rice today. Best to read about her now, while she's still around.

Just weeks ago, Condoleezza Rice made a trip to the Middle East that was widely seen as advancing the peace process. There were hopes among Republicans that she could become governor of California and even, someday, president. But she has since become enmeshed in the controversy over the administration's use of intelligence about Iraq's weapons in the run-up to war. She has been made to appear out of the loop by colleagues' claims that she did not read or recall vital pieces of intelligence. And she has made statements about U.S. intelligence on Iraq that have been contradicted by facts that later emerged. The remarks by Rice and her associates raise two uncomfortable possibilities for the national security adviser. Either she missed or overlooked numerous warnings from intelligence agencies seeking to put caveats on claims about Iraq's nuclear weapons program, or she made public claims that she knew to be false. ________________________________

Washington Post July 27, 2003

Iraq Flap Shakes Rice's Image Controversy Stirs Questions of Reports Unread, Statements Contradicted by Dana Milbank and Mike Allen, Washington Post Staff Writers

Just weeks ago, Condoleezza Rice, President Bush's national security adviser, made a trip to the Middle East that was widely seen as advancing the peace process. There was speculation that she would be a likely choice for secretary of state, and hopes among Republicans that she could become governor of California and even, someday, president.

But she has since become enmeshed in the controversy over the administration's use of intelligence about Iraq's weapons in the run-up to war. She has been made to appear out of the loop by colleagues' claims that she did not read or recall vital pieces of intelligence. And she has made statements about U.S. intelligence on Iraq that have been contradicted by facts that later emerged.

The remarks by Rice and her associates raise two uncomfortable possibilities for the national security adviser. Either she missed or overlooked numerous warnings from intelligence agencies seeking to put caveats on claims about Iraq's nuclear weapons program, or she made public claims that she knew to be false.

Most prominent is her claim that the White House had not heard about CIA doubts about an allegation that Iraq sought uranium in Africa before the charge landed in Bush's State of the Union address on Jan. 28; in fact, her National Security Council staff received two memos doubting the claim and a phone call from CIA Director George J. Tenet months before the speech. Various other of Rice's public characterizations of intelligence documents and agencies' positions have been similarly cast into doubt.

"If Condi didn't know the exact state of intel on Saddam's nuclear programs . . . she wasn't doing her job," said Brookings Institution foreign policy specialist Michael E. O'Hanlon. "This was foreign policy priority number one for the administration last summer, so the claim that someone else should have done her homework for her is unconvincing."

Rice declined to be interviewed for this article. NSC officials said each of Rice's public statements is accurate. "It was and is the judgment of the intelligence community that Saddam Hussein was attempting to reconstitute his nuclear weapons program," said Michael Anton, an NSC spokesman.

Still, a person close to Rice said that she has been dismayed by the effect on Bush. "She knows she did badly by him, and he knows that she knows it," this person said.

In the White House briefing room on July 18, a senior administration official, speaking to reporters on the condition of anonymity, said Rice did not read October's National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, the definitive prewar assessment of Iraq's weapons programs by U.S. intelligence agencies. "We have experts who work for the national security adviser who would know this information," the official said when asked if Rice had read the NIE. Referring to an annex raising doubts about Iraq's nuclear program, the official said Bush and Rice "did not read footnotes in a 90-page document. . . . The national security adviser has people that do that." The annex was boxed and in regular type.

Four days later, Rice's deputy, Stephen J. Hadley, said in a second White House briefing that he did not mention doubts raised by the CIA about an African uranium claim Bush planned to make in an October speech (the accusation, cut from that speech, reemerged in Bush's State of the Union address). Hadley said he did not mention the objections to Rice because "there was no need." Hadley said he does not recall ever discussing the matter with Rice, suggesting she was not aware that the sentence had been removed.

Hadley said he could not recall discussing the CIA's concerns about the uranium claim, which was based largely on British intelligence. He said a second memo from the CIA protesting the claim was sent to Rice, but "I can't tell you she read it. I can't tell you she received it." Rice herself used the allegation in a January op-ed article.

One person who has worked with Rice describes as "inconceivable" the claims that she was not more actively involved. Indeed, subsequent to the July 18 briefing, another senior administration official said Rice had been briefed immediately on the NIE -- including the doubts about Iraq's nuclear program -- and had "skimmed" the document. The official said that within a couple of weeks, Rice "read it all."

Bush aides have made clear that Rice's stature is undiminished in the president's eyes. The fault is one of a process in which speech vetting was not systematic enough, they said. "You cannot have a clearance process that depends on the memory of people who are bombarded with as much information, as much paperwork, as many meetings, as many phone calls," one official said. "You have to make sure everybody, each time, actually reads the documents. And if it's a presidential speech, it has to be done at the highest levels."

Democrats, however, see a larger problem with Rice and her operation. "If the national security adviser didn't understand the repeated State Department and CIA warnings about the uranium allegation, that's a frightening level of incompetence," said Rep. Henry A. Waxman (Calif.), who as the ranking Democrat on the Government Reform Committee has led the charge on the intelligence issue. "It's even more serious if she knew and ignored the intelligence warnings and has deliberately misled our nation. . . . In any case it's hard to see why the president or the public will have confidence in her office."

Rice, a former Stanford University provost who developed a close bond with Bush during the campaign, was one of the most outspoken administration voices arguing that Saddam Hussein posed a nuclear danger to the world. As administration hard-liners worked to build support for war throughout the fall and winter, Rice often mentioned the fear that Hussein would develop a nuclear weapon, saying on CNN on Sept. 8: "We don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud."

Now that U.S. forces have not turned up evidence of an active nuclear program in Iraq, the White House is being barraged with allegations from abroad, and from Democrats on Capitol Hill and on the presidential trail, that Bush and his aides exaggerated their evidence. Rice, who is responsible for the White House's foreign policy apparatus, is the official responsible for how the president and his aides present intelligence to the public.

When the controversy intensified earlier this month with a White House admission of error, Rice was the first administration official to place responsibility on CIA Director Tenet for the inclusion in Bush's State of the Union address of the Africa uranium charge. The White House now concedes that pinning responsibility on Tenet was a costly mistake. CIA officials have since made clear to the White House and to Congress that intelligence agencies had repeatedly tried to wave the White House off the allegation.

The main issue is whether Rice knew that U.S. intelligence agencies had significant doubts about a claim made by British intelligence that Iraq was seeking uranium in Africa. "The intelligence community did not know at that time or at levels that got to us that this, that there was serious questions about this report," she said on ABC's "This Week" on June 8. A month later, on CBS's "Face the Nation," she stood by the claim. "What I knew at the time is that no one had told us that there were concerns about the British reporting. Apparently, there were. They were apparently communicated to the British."

As it turns out, the CIA did warn the British, but it also raised objections in the two memos sent to the White House and a phone call to Hadley. Hadley last Monday blamed himself for failing to remember these warnings and allowing the claim to be revived in the State of the Union address in January. Hadley said Rice, who was traveling, "wants it clearly understood that she feels a personal responsibility for not recognizing the potential problem presented by those 16 words."

In a broader matter, Rice claimed publicly that the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, or INR, did not take issue with other intelligence agencies' view that Iraq was rebuilding its nuclear program. "[W]hat INR did not take a footnote to is the consensus view that the Iraqis were actively trying to pursue a nuclear weapons program, reconstituting and so forth," she said on July 11, referring to the National Intelligence Estimate. Speaking broadly about the nuclear allegations in the NIE, she said: "Now, if there were doubts about the underlying intelligence to that NIE, those doubts were not communicated to the president, to the vice president, or to me."

In fact, the INR objected strongly. In a section referred to in the first paragraph of the NIE's key judgments, the INR said there was not "a compelling case" and said the government was "lacking persuasive evidence that Baghdad has launched a coherent effort to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program."

Some who have worked in top national security jobs in Republican and Democratic administrations support Rice aides' contention that the workload is overwhelming. "The amount of information that's trying to force itself in front of your attention is almost inhuman," one former official said. Another former NSC official said national security advisers often do not read all of the dozens of NIEs they get each year.

Still, these former officials said they would expect a national security adviser to give top priority to major presidential foreign policy speeches and an NIE about an enemy on the eve of a war. "It's implausible that the national security adviser would be too busy to pay attention to something that's going to come out of the president's mouth," said one. Another official called it highly unlikely that Rice did not read a memo addressed to her from the CIA. "I don't buy the bit that she didn't see it," said this person, who is generally sympathetic to Rice.

In Rice's July 11 briefing, on Air Force One between South Africa and Uganda, she said the CIA and the White House had "some discussion" on the Africa uranium sentence in Bush's State of the Union address. "Some specifics about amount and place were taken out," she said. Asked about how the language was changed, she replied: "I'm going to be very clear, all right? The president's speech -- that sentence was changed, right? And with the change in that sentence, the speech was cleared. Now, again, if the agency had wanted that sentence out, it would have gone. And the agency did not say that they wanted that speech out -- that sentence out of the speech. They cleared the speech. Now, the State of the Union is a big speech, a lot of things happen. I'm really not blaming anybody for what happened."

Three days later, then-White House press secretary Ari Fleischer said Rice told him she was not referring to the State of the Union address, as she had indicated, but to Bush's October speech. That explanation, however, had a flaw: The sentence was removed from the October speech, not cleared.

In addition, testimony by a CIA official before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence two days after Fleischer's clarification was consistent with the first account Rice had given. The CIA official, Alan Foley, said he told a member of Rice's staff, Robert Joseph, that the CIA objected to mentioning a specific African country -- Niger -- and a specific amount of uranium in Bush's State of the Union address. Foley testified that he told Joseph of the CIA's problems with the British report and that Joseph proposed changing the claim to refer generally to uranium in Africa.

White House communications director Dan Bartlett last Monday called that a "conspiracy theory" and said Joseph did not recall being told of any concerns.

--Staff writer Walter Pincus contributed to this report.

In peace,

Otoño ________________________________

Is Washington terrorizing us more than Al Qaeda?

While Bush and Tom Ridge play soldier and attempt to flex their macho muscles, all under the guise of protecting our "American way of life from terrorism," one can't help but be struck by the damage that they have done to America. (And, of course, to Iraq and the rest of the world.)

Their continuous pronouncements of high- and medium-alerts is stress provoking and terrorizes the very people they claim this crazy quilt of colors is supposed to protect. Any Psychology or Sociology 101 student could tell you what the probable result would be--increased insecurity, post-traumatic stress, and a sense of being kept perpetually off-balance. In other words, being turned into a child in need of a strong Daddy to protect it.

If you want to see an example of this first-hand, visit the Department of Homeland Security's web site. Do you feel safer now? The administration's propaganda is rooted in a black or white "You're either with us or against us" mentality, and reveals an insecurity and pettiness among our leaders that most of us would prefer not to know about. Are these the people you want to represent you? Do you want to even be identified with these people?

The administration's early-warning mechanism has transformed us into a nation of worriers, not warriors. Forcing citizens to ride an emotional roller coaster without providing any clear instructions on how to soothe their jitters, the current security system has had a profoundly negative impact on our individual and collective mental health. This is the true weapon of mass destruction. ______________________

Psychology Today July 24, 2003

Overcoming Terror by Philip Zimbardo with Bruce Kluger

Log on to the Department of Homeland Security's Web site, ready.gov, and click on "nuclear blast."

Thanks to the recently formed agency, ordinary citizens can now get a crash course in emergency preparedness in the event that a big bomb is dropped on their block.

Step one, says the terse tip sheet, is to "take cover." Step two: "Assess the situation." Step three? "Limit your exposure to radiation."

While the well-meaning 300-word document goes on to reveal a few other curious dos and don'ts for a doomsday scenario (e.g., ingesting potassium iodide is definitely a bad idea when radioactive iodine is coursing through the atmosphere), what's missing from the text is an acknowledgment of the psychological damage that such cursorily assembled, blithely disseminated information can wreak on the public. Presumably intended as a mental health balm in this time of unprecedented global stress, these simplistic big-blast CliffsNotes merely skate atop the frozen pond of the nuclear nightmare, ultimately leaving the befuddled citizen to wonder--and often panic--about the real and present danger that lurks just beneath the ice.

Unfortunately, the Department of Homeland Security's site is just one example of a national warning system that in the end stirs up more anxiety than it quells. Loaded with scientific terminology, yet woefully bereft of any tangible data, the U.S.' early-warning mechanism has transformed us into a nation of worriers, not warriors. Forcing citizens to ride an emotional roller coaster without providing any clear instructions on how to soothe their jitters, the current security system has had a profoundly negative impact on our individual and collective mental health. I call this a "pre-traumatic stress syndrome," and its effect on our day-to-day lives is debilitating.

Established in March 2002, the U.S. terrorism warning system is broken down into the now-famous color-coded levels of alert--green, blue, yellow, orange and red. The degree of risk changes from level to level, even though the specificity of the threat need not. Beginning with a "low risk" green, the threat levels then graduate to "general," "increased and predictable," "likely" (the notorious Code Orange) and culminate with the red-hot "imminent."

Since September 11, 2001, the state of domestic alert has randomly seesawed through the color spectrum, rising as high as "orange" on at least eight occasions. Each time the color has changed, a public official has stepped before the cameras with explanations that alternate between vague and indecipherable. Goose-bump-inducing terms such as "dirty bombs" and "shelter-in-place" are nonchalantly tossed out, but never are Americans given a soup-to-nuts explanation of exactly what is going on. This exercise in ambiguity doesn't serve to calm people as intended. Instead, it scares the bejesus out of them. After all, terrorism is not about war in the traditional sense of the word. It is about psychology--about frightening ordinary people, making them feel confused and vulnerable. And, regrettably, the government is unwittingly engaging in this activity as effectively as Al Qaeda.

Like a car alarm that sounds not when a vehicle is broken into, but instead, whenever it passes through a bad neighborhood, the nation's early-warning system has effectively rendered Americans paralyzed behind the wheel, unable--or unwilling--to step on the gas.

Contemporary clinical data--and my own extended research in this area--prove time and again that to be optimally effective, safety alarms must include four basic components: (1) a credible, trustworthy source communicating the alarm; (2) a disclosure of the specific and anticipated event that has elicited the warning; (3) an effort to reassure those being alerted about the value of unified efforts; and finally, (4) a clearly defined set of actions that citizens can take in order to escape a calamity.

And yet, since September 11, each of these basic principles has been systematically violated in the design and delivery of terrorist alarms issued by the government.

In the first six warnings after the 2001 attacks, different communicators--from Attorney General John Ashcroft to Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge--appeared before the press, alleging that they possessed "reliable" information from "credible" sources that an attack was "imminent." In most cases, the perpetrators were described as anonymous terrorists; their attack would take place sometime in the immediate future; and their target was any number of unnamed locations in the U.S. (or anywhere else in the world, for that matter). As if this fuzzy description of impending doom wasn't sufficiently stultifying, officials then stopped short of offering any specific action that citizens might take in response to the supposed terrorist attacks, other than to remain on alert and to keep their eyes open.

Eventually, these widely disseminated, narrowly defined warnings created greater levels of fear, which over time morphed into general anxiety.

The psychological situation worsened when the administration delivered--in the same breath as its warnings--a collateral message to "go about your business as normal." Rather than give Americans a hook on which to hang their heebie-jeebies (providing facts, for example, that elucidated the wheres and whens of the threats), this unexpected "hey, don't worry" footnote induced a cognitive and emotional disconnect. After all, how was it possible not to fret after being told that our personal safety and security were now at stake? Naturally, the resulting sense of confusion spilled over into feelings of helplessness.

While the first six post-9/11 warnings seemed, at worst, insensitive to the nation's emotional state, the seventh, issued in early February 2003, was downright reckless. After downgrading the level of alert to "unlikely" (from the previous week's "increased likelihood"), Ridge leapfrogged from the precautionary to the preposterous, recommending ways in which citizens could prepare for an attack by the still-unnamed phantom menace. Among these suggestions was sealing ourselves into our homes using plastic sheeting and duct tape. Americans stormed Home Depot. Jay Leno had a field day.

The fact is, not a single terrorist attack occurred on American soil in the 18 months after 9/11. While this was obviously good news for American security, it wreaked havoc on the nation's psyche. Where were the thousands of terrorists allegedly comprising mysterious cells throughout our country? Where was the debriefing by authorities to explain why, after all the hand-wringing, nothing ever materialized? The high alerts silently evaporated as quickly as they arose, but the high anxiety remained--and remains--at full throttle.

All of which raises the question: Is it possible for a government to keep its citizens braced for attack without incapacitating them with fear? It is not only possible--it is a historical fact: On the night of April 18, 1775, patriot Paul Revere rode his horse through the countryside from Boston Harbor toward Lexington, warning local Colonial leaders that the British army was fast approaching. Throughout the evening, Revere faithfully adhered to my four-point theory for successful dissemination of public alarms (something of a miracle, I should add, in that I wouldn't be born for another 158 years). In retrospect, Revere was the perfect messenger delivering the perfect message: (1) He was known to be a highly credible communicator, both expert and trustworthy; (2) his alarm was focused on a specific anticipated event; (3) the alert was designed to motivate citizens to act as a group; and (4) the warning called for a concrete set of actions--namely, fighting back.

As American history books tell you, the day after Revere took his midnight gallop, the Colonial militia trounced the redcoats at Concord. Not a shred of duct tape was needed.

In peace,

Otoño ________________________________

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