June 2004 | ||||||
Sun | Mon | Tue | Wed | Thu | Fri | Sat |
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | ||
6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 |
20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 |
27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | |||
May Jul |
war stories Bush Bargains Badly Kim Jong-il outwits W. on nukes. By Fred Kaplan Posted Friday, June 25, 2004, at 2:36 PM PT
This week, after 20 months of doing nothing about North Korea's drive to
build nuclear weapons, President Bush finally put a proposal—a set of
incentives for disarmament—on the negotiating table. The remarkable thing
is, the deal
It's good that Bush has at last realized that diplomacy is the only way to
solve the crisis. But he's come a bit late to this epiphany. North Korea
has greatly strengthened its hand in the interim. Two years ago, its 8,000
fuel rods were padlocked under international inspection. Now, they've been
reprocessed into bomb-grade plutonium.
Had Bush made the offer back when he first had the chance, Kim Jong-il
probably would have taken it. Kim may take it still; his closest allies,
the Chinese, are urging him to. But if he behaves the way he usually
behaves—the way any cunningly rational leader in his position would
behave—he will up the ante, ask for more, and walk away with a shrug if
Bush declines. And he knows that there's not much Bush can do about it.
Bush has stunningly mishandled this confrontation. He has allowed North
Korea—the most rickety spoke on his "axis of evil," a dangerous regime by
any measure—to reach the crest of becoming a nuclear power. He has
dismissed numerous opportunities to nip this disaster in the bud. And now
he comes up with an old formula that evades the recent shift in the
balance.
In short, by his own careless arrogance, the president of the world's most
powerful nation has allowed himself to be outmaneuvered by the very model
of a modern tinhorn dictator.
The proposal that Bush let Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly put on
the table Tuesday night—a proposal that reportedly originated with South
Korea—amounts to the following: North Korea has three months to commit to
dismantling its nuclear weapons program. Once it makes this declaration,
the United States will provisionally pledge not to invade its territory or
topple its regime. At the same time, South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia
will start sending North Korea an enormous amount of fuel oil each month.
A timetable marking subsequent steps, including the dropping of economic
sanctions, will culminate with North Korea actually dismantling its
nuclear facilities and shipping its plutonium abroad to be destroyed.
The only thing new about this proposal is that it calls for North Korea to
receive energy assistance in the form of heavy fuel. Clinton's 1994
accord, formally titled the Agreed Framework
Bush, it must be said, was not entirely responsible for the Agreed
Framework's collapse. The United States and North Korea both started to
renege on it before Bush's inauguration. The accord called on the United
States, South Korea, and Japan to deliver the first of two light-water
reactors by a target date of 2003, yet the financing went awry almost at
once. Within three months of the accord's signing, the United States and
North Korea were to lower trade barriers and open consulates in each
other's capitals, with the aim of moving "toward full normalization of
political and economic relations." None of those steps was ever taken.
When Bush came to the White House, he aggravated tensions by disavowing
the Agreed Framework, criticizing South Korea's new policy of détente with
the North, and advocating regime change in Pyongyang. The rupture came in
October 2002, when U.S. intelligence discovered that North Korea was
secretly enriching uranium—an alternative method of making nuclear bombs.
The intelligence also indicated that the covert enrichment had begun
during Clinton's presidency.
Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly confronted North Korean diplomats
with the evidence. They confessed, and Bush cut off all ties. Some penalty
had to be inflicted. But at least enriching uranium takes a very long time
compared with reprocessing fuel rods into plutonium. Keeping those 8,000
fuel rods locked up in a pool and guarded by international inspectors,
therefore, should have been Bush's prime concern. If those rods were
unlocked, North Korea could have a dozen nuclear bombs within a year.
After Bush cut off the ties in the fall of 2002, North Korea reacted by
threatening to abrogate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, kick out the
international inspectors, unlock the rods, and haul them to a nearby
reprocessing facility. Bush called these threats "blackmail" and said that
even sitting down to talk about them would constitute "appeasement." The
North Koreans went ahead and did what they said they would do. Bush did
nothing, diplomatically or militarily.
In January 2003, North Korean emissaries, perhaps realizing that they'd
gone too far, reached out to various diplomats and middlemen, saying they
would renew their pledge to the non-proliferation treaty, put the rods
back, and let the inspectors in, if the United States fulfilled its own
commitments under the Agreed Framework. Bush still refused to talk.
Kim Jong-il's actions were irresponsible and ill-calculated, but much
evidence indicates he meant them as a bargaining chip. (In 1993, his
father, Kim Il-Sung, had made similar moves, triggering the crisis that
was resolved with the Agreed Framework.) Still, if Bush was unwilling to
bargain, Kim Jong-il would simply go ahead with his nuclear project,
gaining leverage in the process—to say nothing of hard currency, selling
the stuff on the global black market.
For the next year-and-a-half, a bureaucratic battle raged inside the Bush
administration. Secretary of State Colin Powell urged a diplomatic
approach. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick
Cheney urged economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and military
pressure, which they felt would topple Kim's regime.
Last summer, Bush gave in to the Powell faction, letting his diplomats
talk directly with North Korea's diplomats. He still barred them, however,
from offering any proposals or trades.
And so, the reprocessing continued and North Korea came closer to building
bombs.
This week, finally, Bush caved further to Powell, and authorized real
negotiations. One can imagine a few reasons for this shift.
First, he might have realized that Kim Jong-il's regime can survive, no
matter how hungry his people might be.
Second, the U.S. negotiating partners—China, South Korea, Japan, and
Russia—have started to cut their own separate deals with North Korea. If
Bush let this freelancing go on much longer, the United States would soon
have lost nearly all its influence in the region.
Third, if he ever thought there might be a military option for settling
the North Korean nuclear crisis, the bog of Iraq must serve as a powerful
dissuader.
Fourth, Bush needs a diplomatic victory somewhere to bolster his chances
for re-election. Peace and democracy in Iraq seem a less than likely
prospect. Stopping North Korea from getting the bomb wouldn't be a bad
second choice.
The problem is that Kim Jong-il no doubt knows that Bush is in a spot. If
a deal is to be made, he will try to wring as much as he can—more than he
might have managed while the fuel rods were still locked up and the
inspectors in place. Nukes are the only chips he's got. He will cash them
in at inflated prices—or stack them high with impunity.
Fred Kaplan writes the "War Stories" column for Slate.
_____
Also in today's Slate
press box
low concept
summary judgment
_____
Microsoft Corporation>
©2003 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Terms of Use
10:00:00 AM