A sober, "conservative" assessment of Bush's 2nd term foriegn policy options

THE GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

The Second Term
November 05, 2004  0503 GMT

By George Friedman

The election is over and the worst did not happen. The United States is not
locked in endless litigation, with the legitimacy of the new government
challenged. George W. Bush has been re-elected in a clear victory. Depending
on your point of view, this might have been the best imaginable outcome or
the second-worst possible outcome. Possibly, for some, it is the worst
outcome, with complete governmental meltdown being preferable to four more
years of Bush. However, these arguments are now moot. Bush has been
re-elected, and that is all there is to that.

This means that for slightly more than four years the United States will be
governed by a president who will never run for political office again. In
general, two-term presidents tend to be less interested in political process
than in their place in history. They tend to become more aggressive in trying
to complete their perceived missions, and less cautious in the chances they
take. Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton all encountered serious
problems in their second terms, most due to their handling of problems they
experienced in their first terms. Nixon had Watergate, while Reagan was
handling Central American issues and hostages. Clinton wound up impeached for
his handling of matters in his second term.

Going further back in the century, Woodrow Wilson had the League of Nations
fiasco in his second term, and Franklin D. Roosevelt tried to pack the
Supreme Court. Dwight Eisenhower alone, his place in history assured, did not
suffer serious setbacks from misjudgments, unless you want to view Sputnik,
Yuri Gagarin and the shooting down of the U-2 over Soviet air space as
personal failures.

Second-term presidents tend to look at re-election as vindication of their
first-term policies and as a repudiation of their critics. They see
themselves as having fewer constraints placed on them, and they become less
sensitive to political nuances.

Bush is an interesting case because he was not particularly sensitive to
political nuance in his first term. It is difficult to remember a president
in his first term who was less constrained by political considerations or
political consequences. For better or worse, Bush did not govern with one eye
on public opinion polls. As we learned in the course of his term, he was not
particularly flexible, even when he was running for re-election. We therefore
need to imagine a George W. Bush who is not relatively, but completely,
indifferent to political nuance.

Add to this that his legacy is far from assured. Bush's presidency will be
measured by one thing: Sept. 11 and his response to it. It is far from clear
how history will judge him. There are many parts to the puzzle -- from Iraq,
to homeland defense to Pakistan and so on. They are moving parts. For Bush to
assure his legacy, he must bring the conflict to a successful conclusion --
not easy for a conflict in which success remains unclear.

We therefore have two forces at work. First, second-term presidents tend to
feel much greater freedom of action than first-term presidents -- and tend to
take greater risks. Second, Bush enters his second term with greater pressure
on his legacy than most presidents have. Bush needs to make something happen,
he needs to get the war under control, and he does not have all that much
time to do it. If he is to complete his task before the end of his second
term, he needs to start acting right now. It is our expectation that he will.

His re-election represents the first step. Globally, there was a perception
that Bush had blundered massively. There has also been a long-standing myth
that the United States cannot stand its ground because casualties generate
decisive antiwar movements. In spite of the fact that Nixon buried George
McGovern in 1972, and followed with the Christmas bombing of Hanoi, global
expectations have always been that events in Iraq would generate a massive
antiwar movement that would force Bush from office.

This expectation was first shaken by Sen. John Kerry's campaign. For all his
criticism, Kerry did not campaign against the war. He campaigned against
Bush. This was explained in many circles as merely what Kerry had to say to
get elected, and that after election his true colors would emerge. However,
to more sensitive ears, the fact that Kerry had to campaign as he did in
order to have a hope of election was jarring. The antiwar vote was too small
for the theory. With Bush's victory, one of the fundamental assumptions about
the United States went out the window. In spite of casualties and grievous
errors, not only was there no antiwar candidate (save Ralph Nader), but Bush
actually won the election.

This puts in motion two processes in the world. First, there is a major
rethinking of American staying power in the war going on. The assumption of a
rapid conclusion of the Iraq campaign due to U.S. withdrawal is gone -- and
it is surprising just how many non-Americans believed this to be a likely
scenario. The reassessment of the United States is accompanied by the
realization that the United States will not only maintain its pressure in
Iraq, but on the region and the globe itself.

American pressure is not insubstantial. Virtually every country in the world
wants something from the United States, from a trade agreement to support on
a local conflict. They can do without an accommodation with the United States
for months, but there is frequently serious pain associated with being at
odds with the United States for years. Throughout the world, nations that
have resisted U.S. actions in the war -- both within and outside of the
region -- must now consider whether they can resist for years.

We can expect two things from Bush in general: relentlessness and linkage.
Having won the election, Bush is not going to abandon his goal of crushing al
Qaeda and pacifying Iraq and, indeed, the region. That is understood. Equally
understood is that Bush will reward friends. Bush's test of friendship is
simple: support for the United States and, in particular, support for the
policies being pursued by his administration in the war. For Bush, active
support for the war was a litmus test for good relations with the United
States during the first term. The second term will make the first term look
gentle.

Countries that made the decision not to support Bush did so with the
assumption that they could absorb the cost for a while. They must now
recalculate to see if they can absorb the cost for four more years -- and
even beyond, if Bush's successor pursues his policies. For many countries,
what was a temporary disagreement is about to turn into a strategic
misalignment with the United States. Some countries will continue on their
path, others will reconsider. There will be a reshuffling of the global deck
in the coming months.

The same analysis being made in the world is also being made in Iraq. There
are the guerrillas, most of whom are committed to fighting the United States
to the death. But the guerrillas are not a massive force, and they depend for
their survival and operational capabilities on a supportive population. In
Iraq, support comes from the top down. It is the tribal elders, the senior
clergy and the village leaders who make the crucial decisions. They are the
ones who decide whether there will be popular support or not.

There has been an assumption in Iraq -- as there has in the world -- that as
the pressure builds up in Iraq, the United States will move to abandon the
war. Bush's re-election clearly indicates that the United States will not be
abandoning the war. They are therefore recalculating their positions in the
same way that the rest of the world is. Holding out against the Americans and
allowing their populations to aid the guerrillas made a great deal of sense
if the United States was about to retreat from Iraq. It is quite another
matter if the United States is actually going to be increasing pressure.

It is no accident that as Election Day approached, U.S. forces very publicly
-- and very slowly -- massed around Al Fallujah. Al Fallujah was the town in
which the United States signed its first accord with the guerrillas. As the
election approached, the town went out of control. Now the election is over,
the town is surrounded and Bush is president. It is a time for recalculation
in Al Fallujah as well, as there can be no doubt but that Bush is free to
attack and might well do it.

Throughout the Sunni areas of Iraq -- as well as Shiite regions -- elders are
considering their positions, caught between the United States and the
guerrillas, in light of the new permanence of the Americans. The United
States will be aggressive, but in an interesting way. It will be using the
threat of American power as a lever to force the Sunni leadership into
reducing support for the guerrillas. Coupled with the carrot of enormous
bribes, the strategy could work. It might not eliminate the guerrilla war,
but could reduce it to a nuisance level.

The basic reality thus creates the strategy. The re-election of Bush creates
a new reality at all levels in the international system. His intransigence,
coupled with American power, forces players to think about whether they can
hold their positions for at least four years, or whether they must adjust
their positions in some way. As the players -- from sheikhs to prime
ministers -- reconsider their positions, U.S. power increases, trying to pry
them loose. It opens the possibility of negotiations and settlements in
unexpected places.

It also opens the door to potential disaster. The danger is that Bush will
simultaneously overestimate his power and feel unbearable pressure to act
quickly. This has led some previous presidents into massive errors of
judgment. Put differently, the pressures and opportunities of the second term
caused them to execute policies that appeared to be solutions but that blew
up in their faces. None of them knew they would blow up, but in their
circumstances, no one was sufficiently cautious.

It is precisely Bush's lack of caution that now becomes his greatest
bargaining chip. But his greatest strength can also become his greatest
weakness. The struggle between these two poles will mark the first part of
his presidency. We will find out whether the second part will be the success
of this strategy or his downfall. The book on George W. Bush will now be
written.

(c) 2004 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. All rights reserved.

http://www.stratfor.com

3:17:31 PM    

A good selction of articles and essays on what the Dems should do from Slate....

--------------------------------

Why Americans Hate Democrats—A Dialogue
Depressed liberals analyze what ails them.
Updated Friday, Nov. 5, 2004, at 1:15 PM PT

The day after the election, Slate's political writers tackled the question of why the Democratic Party—which has now lost five of the past seven presidential elections and solidified its minority status in Congress—keeps losing elections. In response to those pieces, Slate also asked a number of wise liberals to take up the question of why Americans won't vote for the Democrats.

"Why Kerry Lost: He was good. Bush was better," by Christopher Suellentrop, posted Nov. 3.

"Democratic Values: How to start winning the red states," by William Saletan, posted Nov. 3.

"Whither Liberalism? Again? Here comes the usual bad advice," by Timothy Noah, posted Nov. 3.

"Moralize, Liberally," by Robert Wright, posted Nov. 4.

"Gotta Have Faith," by Robert Reich, posted Nov. 4.

"More Policy Plans, Please," by Jason Furman, posted Nov. 4.

"The Unteachable Ignorance of the Red States," by Jane Smiley, posted Nov. 4.

"The Party's Message Is Low Risk, Low Reward," by Tom Tomorrow, posted Nov. 4.

"The Indomitable Question That Plagues Liberals," by Katha Pollitt, posted Nov. 5.

"Let's Talk About Faith," by Steven Waldman, posted Nov. 5.

"Maybe It's Not As Bad As We Think," by Walter Dellinger, posted Nov. 5.

"Morality Is the New 'Race,' " by Diane McWhorter, posted Nov. 5.

"Tapping Into the 'Obama' Factor," by Donna Brazile, posted Nov. 5.

12:18:27 AM