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Sunday, November 26, 2006 |
eIntifada: "More than 1 million Palestinians, or one in four inhabitants of the occupied territories, are now mired in deep poverty as living standards deteriorate dramatically following the economic boycott of the Palestinian Authority this year, according to a United Nations report released today."
12:07:02 PM 
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The media world is still abuzz about the juicy and spectacular death of an ex-KGB spy and revelling in the rekindling of the Cold War. Oh joy and happiness! Just in time for the dark Christmas days.
Here is another scenario: Just suppose you're a KGB 'killer', you feel you have the whole world at your feet, but serving your country is not glamorous enough. So in the modern spirit of privatisation and deregulation you set up your own business. What's all the rage today? Right, radioactive material. Where would you get the most for it? In the West, of course. How do you secure a safe passage to the West as an ex-KGB spy? By denouncing Putin, of course. Success guaranteed. It's the old trick of any Russian defector. Then you try to sell your radioactive material and make appointments in sushi restaurants.
In a situation like this, and we can assume that MI5, MI6 and the CIA knew about the smuggling, the powers that be wouldn't even have to interfere. They could simply give this self-unwinding story a Cold War twist to sabotage the Euro-Russian talks.
Improbable? Think twice.
Observer: "Privately, however, there is deep scepticism in Whitehall about whether the Putin administration would be willing to risk a crisis in British-Russian relations by directly authorising an assassination of a British citizen on British soil, particularly using a method that might involve other Britons being contaminated. The two countries are currently engaged in delicate negotiations over energy security.
More than anything, the death of the London-based former KGB spy has placed Russia's still thriving trade in radioactive material under scrutiny. 'From the terrorism threat standpoint, these cases are of little concern but they show security vulnerabilities at facilities,' said an IAEA spokesman.
One of the few figures available, on a database compiled by researchers at Stanford University in the US, revealed that about 40kg of weapons-usable uranium and plutonium were stolen from poorly protected nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union between 1991 and 2002."
11:44:06 AM
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© Copyright 2006 Hetty Litjens.
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