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Friday, February 20, 2004
February 16
The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations, James A. Bill (1988)
I read most of this book back in January, but after I got through the parts I was most interested in, it got set aside and I didn't finish up the last ~10% until earlier this week.
This book is the latest in my ongoing effort to become better informed about the Iranian Revolution. I've been approaching this goal with the attitude that there's no such thing as a single objective and reliable source, and the only way to get a balanced picture is to read a whole lot of sources. The two main problems I'm encountering are that so many books (1) focus heavily on how the Revolution affected American politics with relatively little discussion of Iran itself, or (2) have a strong political bias. Newspaper and magazine discussions suffer from the first problem even more than books do. Books by Iranian authors are relatively free of the first problem but are much worse on the second.
As you may have guessed, The Eagle and the Lion is the book I alluded to in the follow-up discussion on Iran a few weeks ago. The book that I had read before that was President Bani-Sadr's memoirs. The latter was particularly one-sided. Most of Bani-Sadr's biases were obvious enough, and I took them into account, but there were also subtler biases I didn't realize until I read Eagle, hence the follow-up.
Curiously, Bill's book, in spite of deliberately focusing on the relationship between America and Iran, is less America-centric than most. In order to put the relationship in proper context, he provides a pretty solid history of Iranian politics, from World War II. As for bias, he looks surprisingly objective to me, more than I would have expected when I starting looking for books -- but perhaps he's just more subtle, and I'll feel otherwise as I continue with other books. (Gary Sick's are next in line.)
One reason it's so easy to see Bill as objective is because he is so modest in drawing conclusions. His style is that of a secondary-source historian, drawing together a mass of evidence, carefully documented, but remaining aloof when it comes to interpreting it. The result is that the reader draws more conclusions than the author ever asserts.
The most striking example of this is the theory that Rockefeller and his allies precipitated the November 1979 crisis (ie, the hostage taking) in order to give Chase Manhattan Bank legal cover to seize enough Iranian assets to erase $4 billion in bad loans which threatened to destroy the bank's credibility. In the course of detailing the evidence for this bold accusation, Bill presents a meticulous eight-page brief complete with motive, opportunity, patterns of dishonest and fraudulent behavior, and irregular actions which are unexplainable without the theory. Yet at the end of it all, the most he will say is: "Although it seems unlikely that Rockefeller, Kissinger, and the bank planned the shah's admission in order to set up the freeze that would enable them to declare Iran in default, it is very likely that they were sensitive to the serious economic needs of their bank and the importance of establishing a political climate that would serve those needs."
"Sensitive to their needs"! Is he being coy? Is he intentionally setting up the reader to draw the obvious conclusion but without inviting a libel suit, or is he really so skeptical that he thinks where there's all this smoke there still might not be fire? In defense of Chase Manhattan's non-guilt, the best he can do is to quote George Ball, who says the theory gives the accused "too damn much credit. Chase Manhattan is not that bright."
At the very least, this is another scandalous example of corporate bailout. When President Carter made the order to freeze Iranian assets held in American banks, the rationale was that the risk of the new Iranian government withdrawing all these funds was a threat to national security. Aside from the fact that the money legally belonged to the Iranians and it's a questionable act to steal someone's money on the grounds that it might be used against you, Bill notes, "Although it seems certain that such withdrawals would be detrimental to the interests of the Chase Manhattan Bank, it also is clear that it did not represent a serious threat either to the American economy or to U.S. national security." Those who might defend the asset-freeze on the grounds that it was in response to Iran's hostile act of seizing American hostages are left to explain why the U.S. government, upon seizing all these Iranian assets, didn't keep control of them. Rather, they were turned over to the banks, which promptly gobbled them up to pay off their own bad debts, so that President Carter had nothing left to negotiate with.
Although the book covers a wide range of history, where it really excels is in examining the complicated web of conflicting advice that dominated the Carter administration, leading to its disastrous mishandling of relations with Iran before and after the Revolution. (I've written in the past about Reagan's scandalous secret dealings with Iranians, but that shouldn't disguise the fact that Carter's colossal failure was even worse.)
There is plenty of blame to go around ... but Bill casts none of it; he merely documents it. In his characteristic dispassionate style he repeatedly resists calling anyone stupid or wrong, he simply reports what they said and what they advocated, followed up with what really happened. His special talent is to examine responsibility in a matter-of-fact way that doesn't appear to be casting blame, even though strictly speaking it clearly is. For example, he leaves the unmistakable impression that of all the misguided advisers, the most stubbornly, persistently, and influentially misguided was the National Security Council of Zbigniew Brzezinski. But even those to whom he seems to assign culpability, he never seems to bear any ill will.
Naturally, some come out looking better than others, but none come out looking good (with the possible exception of the aforementioned George Ball, which perhaps should make me suspicious...). Even the author himself is not immune. In one particularly charming passage, he is describing how so many supposed experts were so unsuccessful during the summer of 1979 (ie, after the Revolution and before the hostage taking) in recognizing what was really going on and where things were headed. As an example, he offers up himself, quoting his own expert opinion, offered to Newsweek, that Khomeini would not be involved in the government. (This is one of the few places in the book where he is mentioned at all -- a marked contrast to the other authors I've read.) True to form, in offering this confession, he neither makes excuses nor chastises himself; he simply reports what he said and notes that history proved him incorrect.
In the paragraph that follows, Gary Sick is included in the long list of the accused. Twenty years later, Sick, who was a key assistant in Brzezinski's National Security Council, is the most remembered and most cited, but it should be noted that this reference is to Sick's first book, All Fall Down. The more famous one, October Surprise, had not yet been written. I think that Sick's second book repudiates much of what was included in the first, but I'm not certain of that. (I've got both of them right here, waiting for me.)
Another passage, discussing keys to Khomeini's success as a political leader:
[A footnote promises, "For a superb analysis of the concept of leadership in Shi'i Islam, see...", but unfortunately the article is in Persian.]
This is a powerful political concept in parts of the Islamic world, parallel but not identical to our western concepts of legitimacy derived through the consent of the governed. If liberal democracy is going to prevail in the Islamic world, it will do so to the extent that it finds its roots in Islamic political tradition.
There was a time when liberal democratic ideals were just as foreign to the Western world. The arguments in which liberal ideas and Western tradition were reconciled are the classics of political theory which we study. The Islamic world also has an enormous body of literature dealing with political theory, both classical and modern. One of the reasons I argue that 19th century Ottoman history is in such need of study is because it is the time and place where this political puzzle -- how to create a modern political system in an Islamic world -- was most thoroughly and vigorously debated. There is no school of Islamic political thought today -- whether traditional conservative, radical extremist, or anything in between -- which does not have its roots in that discussion. For understanding the Islamic world today, study of the late Ottoman empire ought to be as fundamental as the French Revolution is for understanding the Western world.
9:46:55 PM [permalink] comment []
One advantage of running a letter column is that when I am delayed with my own writing, for whatever reason, I have someone else to fill in for me. Geoff isn't one of the two RMO'ers I originally had in mind to be a guest blogger here, but I'm happy to provide him a forum.
But let me say, as one who sincerely felt that Dean's gubernatorial record trumped all else in making him the most independent and attractive candidate for me going in, I happen to be of the conviction that Kerry is a sure loser.
A reasonably decent man, but a sure loser!
The press and the Republicans are sure to play up the image of Mr Special-Interests, as well as his dealings, fleeting as they may have been, with Johnny Chung. That NBC close-up by Myers the other day was a wake-up call, IMO.
This means that I don't see how the tide isn't going to turn in favor of Bush by November, should Kerry be nominated. Kerry will lose to Bush, IMO.
I've now had an opportunity to ponder the "big picture", so to speak, for most of this week. And I would really like to explain fully, if I may, just how high I believe the stakes are in avoiding a Kerry debacle in the fall. Please bear with me as I lay all this out. Urgent thanks.
Now Bush may be a short-sighted man, but, like Kerry, not necessarily a bad one. The main reason why I've made the sober conclusion that Bush should not be re-elected has just as much to do with consequences around the world than with anything Bush might do in the future.
My chief concern, should Bush be re-elected, is primarily the reactions of other democracies abroad, primarily those of (much of, not necessarily all of) Europe.
Rightly or wrongly, much of Europe -- and probably other democracies around the world as well -- may well react with panic, IMHO, if Bush is re-elected. This is just a sinking feeling I have.
And I also have the distinct feeling that that panic may show itself in pre-emptive economic sanctions aimed at us and in other diplomatic-and-trade hardball measures aimed at making Bush think twice before pursuing further his go-it-alone policies.
This will make our current economic slump look like a tea party, and I think this abrupt response from the free world closing us off in so many tangible ways will overtake us practically immediately after the re-election. The immediate slamming down of all kinds of barriers against us from almost everyone in the free world may be staggering. We may have a real panic here at home with so many global connections snipped. A panic here, not merely a depression.
I wish I was exaggerating. But I have a feeling I'm not.
There's nothing as effective as fear in inducing governments to take drastic measures. And when I say that the other democracies may react to another four years of Bush with stark terror, you'll understand why I feel that all bets are off when it comes to what they may do -- and I am definitely talking short term, as well as long term.
The non-discovery of the illegal WMDs has now upped the ante. A few people, even some usually Democratic-leaning friends of mine, were sometimes willing to give Bush the benefit of the doubt until Mr. Kay's report. But Mr. Kay's report of no WMDs has utterly changed the equation beyond repair.
The recognition by the world that we went to war on poorly vetted intelligence has undoubtedly made many people's blood run cold by now. The perception that the Bush administration is simply a dangerously loose cannon may be more widespread than any of us can guess.
This is why, whatever Bush's intentions, they are sadly no longer relevant. Perception in public life is unfortunately nine-tenths reality. If much of the free world views one as a dangerously loose cannon, then the die is cast, and only a miracle can change that. I am not prepared to risk our tie-in to the world economy on a miracle. Thus, Bush will have to be defeated in November.
Back to Kerry. I've already said that I feel sure that he is not viable. However, right now, unfortunately, it looks as if everyone is running alongside him to jump over the same cliff with him. That will be a tragedy of international proportions, IMO, though it will not necessarily be Kerry's fault. His vulnerability as a candidate sadly owes itself to circumstances that are ultimately beyond his control.
Since Kerry, IMO, will be a disaster in the fall, it is essential that the Democrats nominate someone else to stand against Bush in November.
These next few days are critical in stemming the Kerry juggernaut. He must start having a few defeats now, or Boston will be a suicidal coronation. The only figure plausible enough to stop Kerry right now and viable enough, IMO, to beat Bush in November is John Edwards. Like you, I wish it could be Howard Dean. But that chapter is past.
I regard anything less than a significant number of Edwards victories on Super Tuesday to be a free pass for Kerry to Boston. If Kerry wraps up too many victories on that one day, there will then be no stopping him from that moment on. It will then be too late.
This is why I view a stop-Kerry goal as more important than anything else right now. If Kerry isn't stopped right now, we automatically set in motion a train of events (with Kerry inevitably nominated) that will culminate in the U.S. being completely isolated economically and diplomatically before the end of this year and in the midst of an apocalyptic economic tailspin, given Bush's inevitable victory.
As I say, I wish I was exaggerating. But I have a feeling I'm not. And Kerry simply cannot win over Bush -- IMO, granted.
Kerry must undergo significant defeats on Super Tuesday -- the time is now or never -- and that means that stop-Kerry votes can no longer be fragmented. That's vital. Since, right now, Edwards is the most plausible contender against Kerry, the only way to stem Kerry effectively is to vote for Edwards.
This means that any vote for Dean from now on is, effectively, a vote for Kerry! I hope you see that. I don't believe anyone can afford to vote for Dean now, since that's not only a vote for Kerry but a vote for the global meltdown that I see as coming, inevitably, once Kerry has handed Bush a victory on a silver platter in the fall.
For all these reasons, Edwards has got to win some significant victories on Super Tuesday. People, you and I, have got to start voting for him now! -- IMO.
Boy, I hope I've made myself clear!
Finally, I don't necessarily view Edwards as being as attractive a candidate as Dean. For, despite Dean's occasional carelessness, Dean's clarity in formulating policy as his own man -- and an intelligent and fiscally responsible man, and an interesting one -- made him potentially the most credible candidate of all, IMO. He certainly seemed the most thoughtful and attractive one to me at the beginning. It's a shame what happened. It may have been partly his fault, but there may also be enough additional blame to go around as well.
Edwards is at least an alert enough and an independent enough thinker, IMO, to be viewed as closer to Dean than to Kerry. That's good enough for me at this vital stage, frankly. He's the horse we have to back, starting now!
While I view Kerry as a disaster waiting to happen, I would probably vote for Kerry in November if I had to, merely to forestall the impending disaster I feel sure is coming from most of our European "allies" upon Bush's re-election. However, I still feel sure that voting for Kerry in the fall is an exercise in futility, with Bush winning the general election anyway.
If a miracle happens, and we've done some spectacular fence-mending with all of Europe by then, I might simply sit out the election if Kerry is on the ballot, and not view this election as the most terrifying and pivotal of my entire life after all. But I don't really expect any miracles.
[Now we've seen it for Kerry as well, but still not for Edwards. If Edwards surges ahead and becomes the new front-runner, we'll see it for him tooo.
[I don't understand why you wouldn't vote for Kerry over Bush in the general election. You talk a lot about what a "disaster" Kerry would be, but as far as I can tell your only complaint about him is that he's more likely to lose to Bush, not that he would actually be a bad president. If that's the case, where is the logic in declining to vote for him in November, unless it's just defeatism.
[Regarding Europe's economic retaliation against the United States -- a theory I expect my wife would embrace as well, by the way -- if it's true as you say that other nations will take strong economic measures against us and also that they are terrified of a Bush re-election, why would they wait until after the election to take those harsh measures? Why wouldn't they do it now, and let it damage Bush's chances in the election?]
Dennis Kucinich is still on the ballot here too. If the plan is to pick a no-chance candidate in order to send the party a message, I think he's your guy. (He's mine, anyway.)
[I don't know the California rules well enough to know how feasible it is that Kucinich could actually get a candidate. In most of the states, minority candidates seem to be getting a couple delegates with ~15% of the vote, but not with less than that.
[Probably it depends on where you're voting, since most of the California delegates are pledged at the district level, but I don't know what the effective threshold would be for representation. Most of my friends are in San Francisco or Alameda county, where a sizable minority vote for Dean or Kucinich is conceivable. I don't know about Contra Costa.
[By the way, my rationale was not to "send the party a message", but rather to make practical reforms in the Party at the convention, possibly even including choosing the candidate if the Kerry and Edwards remain close enough that neither collects a clear majority of delegates. My thinking is that the relative size of the Dean bloc makes a single Dean delegate more valuable than a single delegate for someone with smaller support. But if Dean doesn't represent your real interests and Kucinich does, then that's the real factor for you.]
7:09:52 PM [permalink] comment []
Hi Pete,
I'm surely at least partly arrant, or errant, or just full of error (you're the linguist!). But I did see a story about three weeks ago on NBC, Dateline or news, forget which, where they interviewed three people, Bush supporting Republicans, who had donated to the Dean campaign and planned to vote for him in the primary (SC?). There are stories in the press today about how the Republicans in the Wisconsin primary came out strongly for Edwards. And the independent press is even more on this issue:
This latter website has had lots of the "what are Republicans trying to do with contrary voting in primaries" speculation too in previous issues. The turnouts in the primaries have been incredibly high (and not well covered by the press speculating about why), but it seems that Republicans for Bush first tried to get Dean nominated and then when that failed have switched to trying to get Edwards nominated. Of course, I'm probably overblowing it, which is why I was turning to Mark Lew as the voice of reason. ... Which is it, Mark? Do I have something or is Pete right that I'm just arrant (or whatever)?
As one who has admired Dean's record in Vermont for its pragmatism and Dean himself for the maverick governor that he was, I have to say I find the fine record of Kerry, public citizen, somewhat offset, IMO, by the occasionally mean-spirited ads that associates of his have sometimes been running during this present campaign.
So Kerry does sometimes seem unduly negative in his approach.
Now, while I have admired Dean more than Kerry for Dean's refreshing gubernatorial record, I feel more comfortable now, frankly, casting my vote in New York for the usually less dour John Edwards -- less dour compared to Kerry, that is.
Not only does John Edwards seem to be concentrating more on a solely constructive message geared toward revitalizing the future; in addition, a double-check of his profile in the Almanac of American Politics appears to indicate -- as is shown by stats from organizations concerned over fiscal responsibility -- a distinctly more rigorous attitude toward budget discipline than Kerry's. And let's not forget that fiscal responsibility was a key component in the Dean platform.
Kerry is not really a bad man, but his grim approach (which some might understandably view as negative) could put off certain segments of the electorate in November, whereas Edwards' "can-do" approach can sometimes be amazingly inspirational (from what I've seen of his speeches on TV) -- and quite cogent from a policy perspective as well, IMO. Edwards at least seems to have a quicker mind than Kerry -- again, IMO.
Granted, neither Kerry nor Edwards may be quite the independent that Dean was, but Edwards does seem less hemmed in by a script and readier to think on his feet.
[That comparison does raise my estimation of Edwards compared to Kerry, but I still have doubts. On the question of which of them I'd rather have as president I'm still on the fence.
[On the extraneous issues, I think Edwards is marginally more electable than Kerry. (Kerry is more vulnerable to charges of extreme liberal, two-faced, business-as-usual, special-interests politician; but Edwards is more vulnerable on lack of experience, especially when combined with the "in dangerous times we need a tested leader" theme.) I also think that an Edwards candidacy would be more healthy than a Kerry candidacy for the Democratic Party and for civility in politics generally.
[I guess that adds up to a tentative preference of Edwards over Kerry, but if anyone asks me for a recommendation of whom to vote for -- and there are a few in California who might -- I'll tell them to vote for Dean. He's still on the ballot and can still win delegates. To whatever extent a person's vote will make a difference, I think adding another Dean delegate to the convention is still a more constructive effect than moving one from Kerry to Edwards or vice versa.]
12:16:19 AM [permalink] comment []
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