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 Thursday, February 26, 2004
Letters

Geoffrey Riggs (Feb. 20)

It occurs to me that, perhaps, I did not make myself precisely clear in one respect. You state:

A vote for Dean (or Kucinich, or Clark...) is a vote for Kerry only to the extent that electoral momentum for Edwards will help motivate more voters to choose someone other than Kerry down the line.

What I, perhaps, did not make clear(?) is that timing is key here, IMO. You see, I'm not merely concerned over the possible importance of Edwards' gaining momentum but over the importance of Kerry's losing momentum at the same time.

Why?

Timing.

I seriously believe it's now or never to stem the Kerry juggernaut. Thus, a vote for Dean unfortunately fragments the anti-Kerry vote at a critical time and ensures that the Kerry express continues past any hurdle. If it continues through Super Tuesday, then it's all over but the shouting, IMO. I simply don't see another chance to stop it later on, frankly.

In fact, with respect, I don't believe there will be any chance "to choose someone other than Kerry down the line" if Super Tuesday finds Kerry still winning. That's where I sincerely believe you may be wrong.

[Why not? Are they going to call of the remaining state primaries? No. You're concerned that people will conclude that it's "all over" and voters will therefore not bother to vote against him in subsequent primaries. Isn't that what I said?]

And Kerry will undoubtedly win big this time if a number of Dean votes fragment any anti-Kerry votes into votes for two candidates, Dean and Edwards, rather than one, Edwards. Such a showing, to be effective, must, therefore, be concentrated in only one figure, or it won't work. The only such figure that seems viable for now is Edwards -- only he will have to receive every anti-Kerry vote there is out there just to slow Kerry down appreciably, let alone stop him.

[Why does it need to be concentrated into only one figure, except for the sake of momentum? In terms of delegates, any delegate won by, say, Kucinich, is still one less delegate that Kerry gets. Either Kerry gets the 2,161 delegates necessary to secure nomination, or he doesn't. If he doesn't, it makes little difference whether the lost delegates all went to a single opponent or to a combination.

[It's not as if each state is winner-take-all. There are indeed districts where the math will work out so that an Edwards vote is more strategic than a vote for someone else in terms of denying delegates to Kerry, but there will be other districts where it's the reverse. In Hawaii, for example, if all the Edwards voters had switched to Kucinich, it would have cost Kerry two, maybe three delegates.]

Dean himself at one point remarked that, to him, Edwards seemed somewhat the better of the two (of Kerry and Edwards). I'm inclined to agree. That being so, it strikes me we should be wary of letting the perfect (Dean?) be the enemy of the good (Edwards?).

Now if a Dean supporter finds himself preferring Kerry to Edwards, then a vote for Dean clearly doesn't compromise the possibility that one's second favorite (Kerry) will at least be there in the wings at the Endgame in case one's favorite (Dean) cannot pull off a last-minute miracle.

But if a Dean supporter finds himself preferring Edwards to Kerry (emphatically my case), then a vote for Dean at this critical stage merely helps to nominate my least favorite candidate of the three (Kerry)! Clearly, I don't want that.

[This makes no sense. A vote taken from Edwards and given to Dean cripples Edwards, but a vote taken from Kerry and given to Dean does no harm to Kerry. I fail to see the logic here.]

And since I view Super Tuesday as the point of no return, I would want, least of all, to give Kerry an inadvertent leg up by splitting the vote against him at such a critical juncture. At this very moment, any vote for anyone other than Edwards automatically guarantees Kerry the nomination, IMO.

If one views that with alarm (I do), then one has to vote for Edwards. If one does not view that with alarm, then I can see that a vote for Dean harms no one.

Personally, since I view Kerry's possible nomination with considerable alarm, I have to judge it as crucial that we all vote for Edwards now.

But I concede that other Dean supporters may not view things the same way.

[Geoff, you continue to amplify but fail to clarify. I still don't know if your "alarm" about Kerry is only because you feel he can't win against Bush or if you also feel he'd be a bad president.]

Pete Gaughan (Feb. 21)

Neither Dean nor Kucinich stands a chance of getting a delegate from congressional districts on this side of the East Bay hills. I'm in Ellen Tauscher's district 10, which I expect to be a real catfight Kerry/Edwards unless E pulls out before then. (This neighborhood used to be part of George Miller's 7, which will go heavily Kerry.)

Without researching -- but I've been following this, because one of my authors is very active in DeanSpace and Oakland for Dean -- I would guess that Dean could get a delegate each from Berkeley/Oakland/Castro Valley (Barbara Lee's district 9), S.F. (Pelosi, 8), and Silicon Valley (Mike Honda, 15).

Kucinich has a slim chance of one in Marin (Woolsey, 6) and Lee's 9, and a solid chance in Pelosi's 8.

[Thanks for the update, Pete. Congratulations to your guy for picking up his first pledged delegates, in Hawaii. One thing I'll say for Dennis Kucinich: At least he really is a genuine left-wing reformer, unlike that gigantic fraud Ralph Nader. I'll save my full-length anti-Nader screed for some other occasion, but suffice it to say that the reason to vote against Nader is not -- as many liberals are saying -- because it would be a bad strategic move, a "wasted" vote that would only benefit Bush. The reason to vote against Nader is that he would be a horrible president. Worse than Kerry. Worse than Bush.]

Steve Hutton (Feb. 25)

When something shocking and bad happens, we want to know how it happened. The most likely answer (for example, that Kennedy was shot by a nut acting alone) is often unsatisfying. Fortunately, our demand for a better answer generally produces the best answer of all: this bad thing happened because a group of evil people who pretend to be good people deliberately caused it so that they could profit from it. I'm not even a little bit surprised that someone has found a way to claim that the Iranian hostage crisis was deliberately created by ... who was it again? arms dealers? the CIA? Jews? freemasons? rich bankers? yes, rich bankers this time.

Was it likely that admitting the Shah to the United States for medical treatment would lead to a situation where the U.S. would end up freezing Iranian assets? [I believe it was, yes.] Since World War II, I believe the U.S. had frozen the assets of six countries, three of whom it was clearly at war with (North Korea and China in 1950, North Vietnam in 1964), two where it was pretty darned close to war (Cuba in 1963, Kampuchea in 1975), and one special case that virtually everyone had sanctions against (Rhodesia in 1965). It would take something special to get Iran onto this list.

[Right. Something special like a national security advisor and a treasury secretary urging the decision. And "pretty darned close to war" is not a bad description of Iranian-American relations at the end of 1979.]

A mob attacking the U.S. embassy and the police failing to protect the embassy and the mob seizing the embassy and the mob deciding to keep the people in the embassy as hostages and the government of Iran clearly taking the side of the mob -- that was enough. How likely was this to occur? An attack on the embassy was inevitable, and had happened several times already. In the past, the police had protected the embassy and the government apparently promised such protection even if the Shah was admitted to the U.S. for medical treatment. Even without police protection, the embassy was a pretty secure building. Even if a mob seized the embassy they might well have decided the propaganda benefit of releasing the hostages would outweigh the benefit of keeping them. (They did, after all, release the women, blacks, and non-Americans for exactly this reason.) Even if the mob didn't want to release the hostages, the Iranian government had ample reason to get the hostages released or at least oppose their continued captivity.

Looking at the situation as a whole, I don't think a reasonable person would have concluded that the Iranian government (not just a group of students) would hold a group of American diplomats hostage for an extended period or that the Iranian government would do some other thing so outrageous as to get the Iranian assets in the U.S. frozen. Jimmy Carter had access to more information about Iran than David Rockefeller. When he decided to admit the Shah, did he say "66 Americans will be held hostage for 444 days, but at least I'm saving Chase Manhattan's bacon"?

[As I've said before, it wasn't necessary for the hostages to be taken and held, only for some crisis that would greatly worsen Iranian-American relations. Your logic is fallacious. You are focusing on the probability of matching the exact sequence of events that occurred, when any number of sequences would have been just as effective for the results in question.

[The decision to admit the Shah was a long time coming, and it didn't happen at all until after his medical condition became critical. The decision to freeze Iranian assets, on the other hand, happened very quickly and with little deliberation.]

Carter had plenty of reasons for admitting a seriously ill former leader who had been a strong U.S. ally. There were people who disagreed with the decision at the time and it's even easier to disagree in retrospect, but I don't believe that Carter was a puppet whose strings were being pulled by Rockefeller and his friends. He had access to advice from a variety of sources, some of whom may have stood to benefit if U.S.-Iran relations got really bad. (For example, Henry Kissinger said ... the sort of things that Henry Kissinger always says. His connection to Chase Manhattan bank is not the only conceivable explanation for this.) In the end, Carter (a good person and a pretty smart guy, whether or not history will regard him as a good president) made his decision.

[I didn't mean to excuse Carter from responsibility for the decision, nor to suggest that he was anyone's puppet. You're right that he was getting conflicting advice and made his decision by balancing it. But the bulk of the advice in favor of admitting the Shah was coming from individuals advancing private interests.

[I started out as skeptical as you were, and I don't think my fundamental credulity has changed. When I read Bill's presentation of the evidence, I found it compelling. I'm not going to quote the whole chapter here. You've got all the cites. Either you read it and see if you still disagree, or you don't.]

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