Spinning HistoryDoc Searls recently pointed out an interesting article by a UCSB professor offering a new view of the Japanese surrender to end WW II. He later followed up by linking to several articles.
He referred to this message by Leonid as a mind blower, which it is, in a way. If you accept that this as true (I can certainly see it this way), then this is the former Soviet Union spin on things (as opposed to the 'American-centric' spin most of us know). Professor Hasegawa's view is different, but I think Chuq answers it very well.
The Japanese certainly wanted to stop the war, but they didn't want to surrender. It's been many years, and I no longer remember when or where, but I do recall reading about the Japanese reacting badly to Russia joining the war in the pacific because of fear of retaliation (they were brutal to everyone in their zeal to overtake Asia, 'what goes around, comes around'). The text I read assigned quite a bit of importance to the Russian entry to the war as part of the quick surrender.
Our stance was well defined by that point, having learned the lessons of WW I. When the war was over, it had to be completely over and that required a complete and total Japanese surrender. Is it possible that there were inklings of the future cold war policy towards Russia that were expressed in the Potsdam documents? Absolutely! Would this be spun a bit differently if one were looking at it from a Sovient POV? Surely.
Did dropping the first bomb help to influence Russia to join us in finishing off Japan and send a message all at once? Yes, I believe so (if you are not convinced that we can double deal with the best of them, see Robert Stinnett's Day of Deceit [I don't buy all of it, but it is well researched and offers yet another spin on things from a very difficult time] or perhaps James Bamford's Body of Secrets). Were the terms at Potsdam picked for that reason? That I don't buy and don't believe I ever will.
There are two very odd feelings that come from thinking about this discussion.
I don't like seeing the idea floated around that getting hit by a couple of nuclear weapons would not be enough to influence a nation state to stop fighting (without other external influences).
Also, what would cause the leaders of a nation to completely ignore the damage already done by bombs that no one really understands? We like to think that everyone got the idea that large numbers of people die and all regional infrastructure is destroyed, but were the communications systems and command so badly damaged that most (if not all) senior military leaders didn't have a real understanding of the damage? Remember, this is WW II, where a bad lightning storm can take down regional communication links. It's a good excuse, but I still wonder if there was something else going on.
We'll probably never know for sure.
An aside...
If you've studied history a bit, you know that what we're taught in most history courses (the majority of history in the US is taught using text books from a common group of vendors) is biased by those who do the compiling. History textbooks are compilations of historical facts; a CliffNotes version of many historical texts if you will, with the better ones using additional direct research from official and unofficial transcripts.
The only real downside in becoming interested in history is realizing that you will never fully understand all of it, I think that's why we have so many period specialists. The more you know, the easier it is to see how much you have left to learn.
3:08:52 PM 
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