The WV Supreme Court recently granted a petition for appeal to review the issue of whether the common-law doctrine of necessaries should apply equally to men as to women. The original common-law doctrine of necessaries was applied to require a husband, in return for obtaining vested control of his wife's property upon marriage, to fulfill a duty to provide certain "necessaries" for his wife's expenses, including food, shelter, clothing and medical expenses. This anachronistic doctrine arises in modern litigation when, for example, a hospital seeks to collect from the husband medical expenses incurred by the wife, or, more frequently, where the bill-collecting hospital seeks to modernize the rule and urge courts to require wives to be obligated for the expenses incurred by the husband, but that cannot be paid the the husband's estate. In other words, courts are asked to apply what's sometimes called the goose-gander rule. (In case you're not familiar with this rule, it's stated as: What's good for the goose is good for the gander.)

Some states, like Michigan, have abrogated the doctrine entirely on equal protection grounds, See, North Ottawa Comm. Hosp v. Kieft (1988), while others, such as New Hampshire, have applied the rule equally to wives, See, St. Joseph Hospital of Nashua v. Rizzo, (1996).

The West Virginia case is Raleigh Gen. Hosp. v. Caudill, No. 31322 (granted May 14, 2003 by a vote of 4-1, Justice McGraw would refuse). Oral argument will be held this fall.

Late last year, the US Supreme Court denied a petition for cert filed by Mobil Corporation from the WV Supreme Court's decision in SER Mobil Corp. v. Gaughn, 211 WV 106 (April 25, 2002), relating to asbestos mass trial procedures. Thereafter, certain claims proceeded to trial against defendant Union Carbide. The jury's conclusions in October of last year were "mixed" according to this release, from Dow's corporate news center.

Currently pending is Union Carbide's Peititon for Writ of Prohibition, or, in the Alternative, Petition for Appeal, (filed April 24, 2003) which is set for consideration by the Court in conference on June 12. The petitioners seek to prohibit enforcement of trial scheduling order that has a Phase II trial scheduled to proceed on causation and liability, as well as prohibit the enforcement of an order that precludes the petitioners from re-litigating certain issues decided by the jury in the Phase I trial. Various claims relating to conduct of the Phase I trial are also raised. The plaintiffs below have filed a response to the petition, stating that prohibition is not an appropriate remedy at this time, and responding to each of the petitioner's arguments on the merits.

If the Court issues a rule to show cause on June 12, the respondents (plaintiffs in the mass trial pending before the mass litigation panel in Kanawha County Circuit Court) will have the opportunity to file a further response, and oral argument will be scheduled.