Updated: 24.11.2002; 12:36:56 Uhr.
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Friday, July 27, 2001

More on the risk of moving and identity theft (Re: RISKS-21.54)

The card was requested from a phone in Richmond, Virginia, after I filed a change of address with the Virginia DMV. Virginia drivers licenses have the SSN as the default identifier. Within a week, charges were being made using the fraudulent card in Florida and California.

Harry Erwin, University of Sunderland. Computational neuroscientist modeling bat bioacoustics and behavior.

[Virginia was where in 1991 DMV employees were fraudulently giving out bogus licenses. See the lead item in RISKS-11.41. PGN] [Harry Erwin via risks-digest Volume 21, Issue 55]
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Telling all to the police

*The New York Times* reports (27 Jul 2001) on 17 Jul theft from 9 lockers at an upper East Side sports club. Directly after they called the police a call was received from "the police fraud department" and 4 victims responded to a series of questions and gave their credit card numbers, husbands names, SSN, PINs and mothers' maiden names. Anything wrong with that? That is, aside from when the police did arrived they said there is no such dept.

One womans tale: she called the credit card issuers but couldn't reach her bank, being after hours and all. The next morning she found $500 had been taken using her bank card.

The Risk, stupidity or cupidity aside, is being unlucky enough to be a victim outside bankers hours ... and in a bank not having a 24-hour notification phone#. There Oughta Be A Law, as credit cards, that limits consumer loss to $50 for such cases.

(PS: the same woman said she had worked out daily until then but "Now I am so paranoid I haven't been back". That's probably the wrong lesson learned).

Norm deCarteret NSDEC Inc [Norm via risks-digest Volume 21, Issue 56]
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Online advertising: Fraud, false positives and a novel DOS attack

There has been some comment, in recent editions of risks, on the subject of online advertising as seen from the perspective of a Web surfer.

From the viewpoint of a Webmaster seeking ad income, there are some interesting aspects including what seems to be a novel form of DOS attack.

I'll focus on one particular advertising model known as Cost Per Click or CPC.

In this mechanism, a Web site will display a banner for an advertiser and, when a surfer clicks on the banner, the advertiser will pay a small sum to the publisher of the Web site. Thus the publisher will receive an income dependent on the CPC multiplied by the Click Through Ratio or CTR.

A simple click may cost an advertiser somewhere between two and fifty US cents and there is normally an agency of some sort between the two parties to see fair play, count the clicks, handle payments etc.

One fairly obvious risk is that an advertiser who wants brand awareness and not clicks can get free advertising by running ads that will not get clicked but which will enhance brand recognition.

From the advertisers viewpoint, fraud is the main risk. A Web site owner may use an automated system to generate bogus clicks to claim money that was not properly earned. There are thousands of http proxy servers that suffer from the same weakness that allows spam e-mail to exploit open smtp relays. Using these, a Web site owner bent on fraud can generate thousands of bogus mouse clicks.

Of course, advertisers or, more commonly, the agencies with whom they deal take whatever steps they can to combat such fraud. One route used by many is just to have a cut off point for the CTR and say that a Web site with a high CTR will be automatically barred for fraud. Clearly this leads to the normal risk of false positives where a legitimate site with a high CTR is excluded. Interestingly, the false positives will here work to exclude the sites which are the best ones for the advertiser to use. For example, suppose that a dating agency, specialising in women from Russia seeking men from the West, uses an agency to run its banner ads on the Web sites represented by the agency. Most of the time, such ads will attract a CTR of about 0.2%. But what if one of the sites in the ad agency network happens to specialise in advice on exactly this topic? (Fiancee visas, how to address a letter to a country the uses the Cyrillic alphabet etc.) That site may see a CTR of over 5% which will rapidly earn it exclusion for fraud. Of couse, that is exactly the site on which the advertiser would like to run its ads.

And the novel DOS attack?

Recent reports on the Web publisher forums at geekvillage.com have focussed on another problem. Suppose that two sites are in competition as they cover the same subject area and target the same pool of surfers and advertisers. Site A runs banner ads and site B would like to get those ads for itself and perhaps even close down site A and get the surfers too. The operator of site B could set up a click-bot to cause open proxy servers to send thousands of clearly false clicks to the advertiser: seemingly on behalf of site A. Site A will soon be flagged for fraud and will lose its advertising income and may well close.

John O'Connor http://www.jpoc.net ["John O'Connor" via risks-digest Volume 21, Issue 57]
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Identity theft

It would interesting to see what the vetting process was for the salesperson(s)? There seems to be an incredible amount of information that was revealed without (m)any controls in place.

Huge identity theft uncovered; Files with Social Security and driver's license numbers pasted in chat room; possible link to cell phone applications, By Bob Sullivan, MSNBC, 25 Jul 2001

Key personal data belonging to hundreds of individuals have been shared in an Internet chat room, in what one expert says could become one of the largest identity-theft cases ever. The data include Social Security numbers, driver's license numbers, date of birth and credit card information - everything a criminal would need to open an online bank account, apply for a credit card, even create the paperwork necessary to smuggle illegal immigrants. It is still unclear how the data ended up in the chat room, but an MSNBC.com investigation has revealed common threads among the victims - including the purchase of a cell phone online from VerizonWireless.com or an AT&T Wireless reseller. Full text of the article can be found at http://msnbc.com/news/604496.asp?cp1=1 [Jack Holleran via risks-digest Volume 21, Issue 56]
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Maximillian Dornseif, 2002.
 
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