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Thursday, September 21, 2006
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Great short essay from Bruce Schneier on effective security and terrorism prevention. It's only recently that I've become a tad tuned into the business of addressing terrorism via the policework model as opposed to the "war on terrorism" model. I have to say, the policework model makes a great deal sense.
Here's Bruce's essay:
Despite what you see in the movies and on television, it's actually very difficult to execute a major terrorist act. It's hard to organize, plan, and execute an attack, and it's all too easy to slip up and get caught. Combine that with our intelligence work tracking terrorist cells and interdicting terrorist funding, and you have a climate where major attacks are rare. In many ways, the success of 9/11 was an anomaly; there were many points where it could have failed. The main reason we haven't seen another 9/11 is that it isn't as easy as it looks. Much of our counterterrorist efforts are nothing more than security theater: ineffectual measures that look good. Forget the "war on terror"; the difficulty isn't killing or arresting the terrorists, it's finding them. Terrorism is a law enforcement problem, and needs to be treated as such. For example, none of our post-9/11 airline security measures would have stopped the London shampoo bombers. The lesson of London is that our best defense is intelligence and investigation. Rather than spending money on airline security, or sports stadium security -- measures that require us to guess the plot correctly in order to be effective -- we're better off spending money on measures that are effective regardless of the plot.
Intelligence and investigation have kept us safe from terrorism in the past, and will continue to do so in the future. If the CIA and FBI had done a better job of coordinating and sharing data in 2001, 9/11 would have been another failed attempt. Coordination has gotten better, and those agencies are better funded -- but it's still not enough. Whenever you read about the billions being spent on national ID cards or massive data mining programs or new airport security measures, think about the number of intelligence agents that the same money could buy. That's where we're going to see the greatest return on our security investment.
2:40:29 PM 
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© Copyright 2006 Stephanie A. Kesler.
Last update: 10/1/2006; 6:24:57 PM.
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